





This Article examines what law can do to enable an electorate
comprised of mostly ignorant voters to obtain meaningful representa-
tion and to hold elected officials accountable for the government's
performance. Drawing on a half-century of research by political sci-
entists, we argue that political parties are both the key to good elec-
tions and a common cause of electoral dysfunction. Party labels can
help rational, low-information voters by providing them with credi-
ble, low cost, and easily understood signals of candidates' ideology
and policy preferences. But in federal systems, any number of forces
may result in party cues that are poorly calibrated to the electorate
and issue space of subnational governments. Further, the geographic
clustering of partisan voters can lead to persistently dysfunctional
elections at subnational levels, however well calibrated the major-
party cues, because in these communities the aggregation of votes will
not neutralize (as it otherwise would) the ballots cast by citizens
whose party ties reflect their upbringing and social milieu more than
their observations about what the government has done. To date,
these problems have largely been the province of political science and
sociology. We argue that they are problems of, and for, election law.
Statutes and court decisions govern who selects a party's candidates,
what information appears on the ballot, and any number of other var-
iables that affect the meaning and utility of party labels. Our analysis
challenges the focus of decades of political science and legal scholar-
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ship, and sheds new light on important questions about party regula-
tion, ballot design, the choice between partisan and nonpartisan elec-
tions, and the constitutional law of party rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Most voters are astonishingly ignorant of the basic facts about gov-
ernment and politics. Pioneering survey research by University of Mich-
igan political scientists focused the discipline's attention on this problem
half a century ago.' In the years since, successive generations of political
scientists have tried to understand whether-and if so, how-elections
yield meaningfully democratic outcomes notwithstanding widespread
voter ignorance.
The political science debate about how well elections work, given
voter ignorance, has largely passed legal scholarship by.2 This Article
1. ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 15-17 (1960).
2. To the extent that election law scholars address questions of voter information and compe-
tence, they do so largely in writing about campaign finance. See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying
text. There are, of course, some exceptions. See, e.g., HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY
INDEX: WHY OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO Fix IT 5-16 (2009) (proposing ranking
of states based on election performance, in part to provide underinformed voters with voting cue for
Secretary of State races); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Representation Reinforcement Through Advisory
Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1366,1371-72 (2005) (arguing that adviso-
ry election commissions could improve election law policymaking by providing salient heuristics);
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85 VA. L. REV.
1533, 1584-86 (1999) (proposing use of candidate statements on ballot to improve voter performance);
Heather K. Gerken & Douglas B. Rand, Creating Better Heuristics for the Presidential Primary: The
Citizen Assembly, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 233 (2010) (exploring early primaries and citizen commissions as
heuristic guides for low-information voters in presidential primaries); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Cen-
ter Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 330
(2011) (noting that polarized political parties may improve voter competence); David Schleicher, What
if Europe Held an Election and No One Cared?, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109 (2011) [hereinafter Schlei-
cher, What If] (explaining failures of European Parliament elections in terms of "mismatched" party
system, election law, and rational voter ignorance); David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Com-
petition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J. L. & POL. 419 (2007) [hereinafter
Schleicher, Why] (arguing that city council elections are not competitive because of the interaction
between voter ignorance, election laws, and "mismatched" parties); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance
and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional
Theory, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1287,1310, 1313-14 (2004) (arguing that countermajoritarian difficulty is less
difficult when voter ignorance is considered).
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provides the beginnings of a corrective. Our aim is to depict the essential
contours of the voter-information problem and to explain how election
law might change in response. We also hope to shift the focus of political
science research on voting and elections. The dominant question in the
field for the last fifty years has been, "Do elections work, given the voter
information problem?"3 We think it more profitable to ask, "Which elec-
tions work least well, and what can law do to make them work better?"
We begin, in Part I, by recapping the political science of voter igno-
rance. Though there is no disciplinary consensus about whether elec-
tions "work," given what voters know, political science has revealed cer-
tain mechanisms through which a low-information electorate may behave
as if reasonably well informed. To the extent that the electorate per-
forms well, the credit is largely due to political parties, and to the statisti-
cal properties of aggregation (which can neutralize uninformed votes).
At their best, political parties provide voters with simple, reliable, and
easily learned cues about candidates' ideology and policy preferences.
Meanwhile, the organization of legislatures along party lines enables vot-
ers to identify the dominant governing coalition and to connect their
stray observations of politics and policy to the party then in charge. This
process, aggregated across the electorate as a whole, can yield collective-
ly rational responses to information about governmental undertakings.
As the political scientist E.E. Schattschneider famously noted,
"[M]odern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties."4
But the existence of political parties is not a panacea. Voters may
fail to discern the partisan balance of power, or the issue positions of the
parties. Voters may blame the governing coalition for events beyond its
control, or judge its performance myopically. Moreover, not all voters
see and respond to parties in informational terms. Many have an essen-
tially affective rather than instrumental relationship to their party of
choice. Partisanship for them is largely an incident of upbringing, one
which resembles nothing so much as felt ties to family, religion, clan, or
tribe. We shall refer to these citizens as "Michigan Voters," in recogni-
tion of foundational research on the sociology of partisanship by political
scientists at the University of Michigan.s
Thus, although parties are necessary for the operation of mass de-
mocracy given voter inattention to politics, they do not "solve" the prob-
lem of voter ignorance tout court or even improve it to the same degree
in all places and at all times. Rather, party cues work more or less well
3. See infra Part I.
4. E.E. SCHATMSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942).
5. For ease of exposition this paper generally treats citizens as ideal types-either pure "Michi-
gan Voters" or pure "Bayesian updaters," i.e., voters who neutrally use new information to update
their priors about the consequences of putting one party or the other into power. No doubt most peo-
ple are mixed types; we all have a bit of Maize and Blue in our party identifications. The important
question is the aggregate degree and distribution of affective partisanship in the electorate.
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depending on factors that vary predictably across different types of elec-
tions. This is our central point in Part II, which takes up the question of
which elections are likely to suffer the most on account of voter igno-
rance, and why. (Throughout this Article, we will treat elections as per-
forming well insofar as they yield the result that would have occurred if
voters followed politics and policy closely and voted based on their poli-
cy preferences and expectations about government performance.')
National elections, which receive the bulk of political scientists' at-
tention, present comparatively propitious conditions for collective com-
petence. The national parties-Democrats and Republicans-have ideo-
logically differentiated platforms that are reasonably stable over time.
The parties also organize the legislature into clear voting blocs, enabling
voters to see who's in charge. Party labels on the ballot make it easy for
voters to link parties and candidates. And, critically, the major-party
brands are substantively well-tailored to the national issue space and
electorate. By this we mean (1) that learning a candidate's party affilia-
tion enables voters to infer the candidate's position on most significant
issues of national policy; (2) that the packaging of policy positions into
party labels tracks latent preference correlations within the electorate (so
that voters who favor the Democratic position on issue x are also likely
to favor the Democratic stance on issue y); and (3) that the major party
brands divide the electorate fairly evenly, such that roughly half of the
electorate prefers the Democratic brand to the Republican brand and
vice versa.
One probable and salutary consequence of the balance between
Democratic and Republican identifiers in the national electorate is neu-
tralization of the Michigan Vote. That is, votes cast by affective Demo-
crats are likely to cancel out those of affective Republicans, leaving con-
trol of Congress and the White House in the hands of voters whose
partisan preferences respond to information.
By contrast, many state and local elections (as well as primary elec-
tions at all levels) present significant cause for concern. As Part II ex-
plains, this is not simply because voters pay less attention to these elec-
tions. It is also because our system of election law does not provide
voters in these elections with on-ballot voting cues of comparable quality
to the party labels used in national elections.
Party labels are absent from the ballot in initiative and referendum
elections, most local government elections, and some elections for state-
level office.' In other subnational elections, party labels are present but
substantively "mismatched"-not well tailored-to the issue space and
6. Many political scientists make essentially the same move. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Unin-
formed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SC. 194 (1996); Richard R.
Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, 91 AM. POL. SC. REV. 585 (1997).
7. See infra Part IA.
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electorate for the government in question.8 Where subnational wings of
the national parties do not compete for the local median voter on the ba-
sis of issues specific to the corresponding level of government, the party
brands will not fulfill their proper informational role. (We will argue
that failures of rebranding can occur for a variety of legal and strategic
reasons.)
Subnational elections often suffer as well from mismatch at the level
of perceptions: many voters do not see and respond to the local policy
content of the major-party brands. Oblivious or confused, these voters
base their decisions in subnational elections on what they know about
the parties' position-taking and performance at the national level. A fur-
ther problem is that in subnational polities that are overwhelmingly
Democratic or Republican by national party ID, the Michigan Vote is
not likely to be self-canceling.' It will, instead, foreordain the general
election winners, relegating the choice of lawmakers and control of gov-
ernment to unlabeled, information-poor primary elections in which the
voters who participate make up a small, unrepresentative slice of the
population eligible to vote." What results are elections that provide little
guidance to elected officials on issues specific to the government in ques-
tion, and do little to hold the governing coalition accountable for its per-
formance.
What follows for law and legal scholarship? That is the question of
Part III. The most important implication and the subject of Part III.A is
that legal scholars and good-government reformers should start thinking
about law's potential to influence the quality and availability of major-
party cues or their functional equivalents.
Ballots could, for example, "label" the existing partisan balance in
government in addition to labeling candidates, thereby enabling retro-
spective voting by citizens who would otherwise be in the dark about
which party is responsible for recent policy initiatives and social condi-
tions. Party labels could be introduced into elections where they are cur-
rently missing, such as initiative and referendum elections, as well as
nonpartisan state and local elections. And party labels could be modified
to better distinguish the party at different levels of government, which
may facilitate the development of locally differentiated party brands and
make it easier for voters to see their content. To the same end, voter reg-
istration laws could be revised to make it easier for voters to change par-
ties between local and national elections, encouraging localized rebrand-
ing from the bottom up.
But what of elections for governments as to which the major parties
cannot be induced to develop well-tailored brands, or where the conven-





tional party brands otherwise cause more harm than good (e.g., due to a
severe imbalance of Michigan Voters)? Here we urge the removal of
conventional party labels, in favor of party substitutes. We suggest two
party-substitute cues that would approximate the desirable properties of
well-calibrated major-party cues, and that could be printed on the ballot
in formally nonpartisan elections.
The first of the party-substitutes, the executive cue, would signal en-
dorsement by the most powerful elected official in the government at is-
sue, e.g., the mayor or governor. Because of their visibility, mayors and
governors can develop party-like personal brands. Labeling candidates
for lower-profile offices on the ballot with the chief executive's endorse-
ment would help voters to locate those candidates in the issue space of
local politics.
Alternatively, states or cities could combine formally nonpartisan
elections with a system of advisory open primaries designed to induce the
formation of new party-like brands specific to subnational governments.
Under the regime we envision, candidates would qualify for the ballot
through a nonpartisan process, such as by submitting signatures from a
certain number of registered voters. Political entrepreneurs would be in-
vited to conduct advisory primary elections open to candidates and voters
irrespective of their affiliation with official political parties. (In recogni-
tion of the open character of the advisory primaries, organizers would
not be permitted to name their event after a political party with which
voters have registered.) Candidates and voters would be limited to par-
ticipating in one advisory primary per election cycle for the government
in question. The winners of the two most popular advisory primaries,
measured by the number of voters who opt in, would be designated as
such on the ballot. This would lead to the development of a "two-
notation system" in which the most popular advisory primaries function
as de facto party cues calibrated to the government at issue.
As this preview makes clear, our prescriptions range from the sim-
ple to the fanciful, and are largely untested. We offer them not as a reg-
imen for reform, but rather to illustrate how law might improve the per-
formance of those elections most at risk due to voter ignorance, and to
begin a conversation with legal scholars, political scientists, and policy
entrepreneurs. Oddly enough, despite half a century's work on the prob-
lem of voter ignorance, political scientists have paid little attention to the
effects of law on party branding, and to the possibilities for better label-
ing of ballots.
Whether election law can realize the meliorative function we as-
cribe to it will depend not only on the ingenuity of reformers, but also on
the cooperation of the courts. The Supreme Court has curtailed public
regulation of political parties through its "associational rights" jurispru-
dence. This body of law-our subject in Part III.B-expressly presumes
that the ordinary voter is highly informed and engaged. Reasoning from
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that mistaken premise, the Court has declared that there is no legitimate
state interest in trying to ensure that the major political parties establish
and maintain ideologically coherent and electorally competitive brands.
This cannot be right.
Part III.B concludes with some thoughts on what party-associational
interests the First Amendment should be understood to protect. Parties,
we suggest, should be treated as private associations with the designated
public function of enabling a low-information electorate to steer public
policy and hold the governing coalition accountable for results. On the
approach we suggest, every citizen would have an interest in associating
with any major political party, and no person or collectivity would have a
privileged right to speak "on behalf" of the party. Courts would charac-
terize burdens on political association by assessing whether the form of
association sought by the plaintiff would further, or retard, the party's
performance of its public function.
A caveat before proceeding: It is not our intention in this paper to
provide a comprehensive overview of all the ways in which election law
might mitigate or aggravate the voter-ignorance problem. We focus on
parties and party labels because of their manifest importance and their
history of regulation by law, but we certainly agree that there are other
veins for legal scholars concerned with voter ignorance to mine."
I. VOTING WITHOUT (MUCH) INFORMATION: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY
Two questions have anchored voting research for nearly half a cen-
tury. Given a vast amount of evidence that voters lack much in the way
of relevant factual knowledge of politics and policy, how do they make
voting decisions? And what can we say about the quality of these deci-
sions? This Part reviews the political science literature on voter compe-
tence and shows that the answers on offer are varied, rich, and full of dis-
agreements. Some common points, however, appear. Voters benefit
greatly from on-ballot tools, such as political party labels, that help them
translate their policy preferences or retrospective evaluations into re-
sponsive votes. The aggregation of votes across large numbers of citizens
can (but may not) yield coherent, seemingly well-informed outcomes
even if most voters have little relevant knowledge. And partisanship is a
bit of a double-edged sword: the organization of politics through political
parties helps voters to infer what candidates are likely to do in office and
makes the dominant governing coalition legible, but partisanship can also
distort voters' factual perceptions and attributions of responsibility.
11. In a companion paper we mine some of these veins ourselves. See Christopher S. Elmendorf
& David Schleicher, Districting for a Low-Information Electorate, 121 YALE L.J. 1846 (2012).
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A. "Constantly Bamboozled"? The American Voter As Political
Ignoramus
Contemporary critics of the American voter's ignorance have a long
and illustrious lineage. In the first part of the twentieth century, the na-
tion's two most prominent journalists-Walter Lippmann and H.L.
Mencken-were savage in their treatment of the ordinary voter. "The
individual man does not have opinions on all public affairs," wrote
Lippman.12 "He does not know what is happening, why it is happening,
what ought to happen."" Mencken was even more severe: "The Ameri-
can people, true enough, are sheep.... They are thus constantly bam-
boozled and exploited by small minorities of their own number, by de-
termined and ambitious individuals, and even by exterior groups."14
The great political theorist Joseph Schumpeter extended and re-
fined this critique. In his classic work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democ-
racy, Schumpeter broke with traditional democratic theory and denied
the existence of a common will or even public opinion prior to political
elites' contest for power." Citizens, he observed, have little incentive to
learn about politics, in contrast to their strong monetary and social incen-
tives to be good at their jobs.16 They are relegated by their lack of infor-
mation to the essentially passive role of judging contests between politi-
cal leaders, as opposed to forcing leaders to represent their pre-existing
preferences." (Anthony Downs would formalize Schumpeter's incen-
tives-and-information argument some years later.")
Schumpeter's conjecture about voter ignorance was not paired with
systematic national evidence until the middle of the century, when Uni-
versity of Michigan political scientists developed nationwide surveys of
voters, now known as the American National Election Studies.19 The re-
sults were collected in the landmark volume, The American Voter.20
"Our detailed inquiry into public attitudes regarding what we took to be
the most prominent political issues of the time," the authors concluded,
"revealed a substantial lack of familiarity with these policy questions....
We have, then, the portrait of an electorate almost wholly without de-
12. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC 29, 29-55 (Transaction Publishers 1993) (1927).
13. Id.
14. H.L. MENCKEN, NOTES ON DEMOCRACY 78 (photo. reprint 1977) (1926).
15. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 251-68 (1942). Dis-
cussions of voter ignorance have been part of political theory at least as far back as Thucydides.
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR § 6.1.1 (Rex Warner trans., 1954) (blaming the
failure of the Athenian invasion of Sicily on voter ignorance).
16. SCHUMPETER, supra note 15, at 258-60.
17. Id. at 262-68.
18. ANTHONY DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-60 (1957).
19. The Origins of the ANES, AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUD., http://www.electionstudies.org/
overview/origins.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
20. CAMPBELL ETAL.,supra note 1, at 15-17.
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tailed information about decision making in government." 21
Since The American Voter, there have been countless surveys show-
ing the ignorance of American citizens about politics and policy. Michael
X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter pulled the key findings together in the
mid-1990s. 2 Their book is a horror-show of specifics. Here are some ex-
amples:
Knowledge of Institutions and Processes
* Only 55% of citizens know there are two senators from each
state and only 25% know the length of a senatorial term
* 21% can define fiscal policy, 18% can define monetary policy,
and 39% can define free trade
* 19% can name all three branches of government 23
Knowledge of People and Players
* 35% could name both senators from their state
* 59% knew whether their governor was a Democrat or Republi-
can 24
Knowledge of Domestic Politics
* 54% knew what the Watergate scandal was about in 1973
* 31% knew what Affirmative Action means25
Knowledge of Foreign Affairs
* 49% knew that the United States is the only country to have de-
ployed a nuclear weapon
* 18% knew Israel was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in 198626
Level of Knowledge within Selected Variable
* Only 21% can get within 10% of how much of the population has
no health insurance
* Only 30% can get within 10% of how much of the federal budget
is devoted to defense or Social Security27
There has been some criticism of such measures of voter
knowledge, as they may be sensitive to the way questions are asked or to
voters' ability to recall information quickly, rather than at all.2 Even so,
21. Id. at 542-43.
22. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & Scort KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS
AND WHY IT MATTERS 16-21 (1996).
23. Id. at 70-71.
24. Id.at 74-75.
25. Id. at 80-81.
26. Id. at 84.
27. Id. at 93.
28. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsid-
eration of Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 430 (2009) (demonstrating greater
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few researchers believe that voters are anything other than poorly in-
formed about politics and policy. 29 Voter opinions about policy often di-
verge from those of experts who share the voter's ideology.3 0
U.S. politicians, however, behave as if they faced a somewhat in-
formed populace. In speeches and in ads, politicians discuss facts that
improved during their tenure in office (and mention facts that got worse
during their opponents' tenure); they make policy arguments in political
commercials; they change their positions in strategic ways, toward the ex-
tremes during primary campaigns and toward the center in general elec-
tions; and they generally attempt to appeal to voters through substantive
(as well as nonsubstantive) political rhetoric.
It is hard to square this behavior among actors with a personal in-
terest in winning votes with the largely unthinking picture of the elec-
torate painted in survey data. It is equally difficult, though, to look at
U.S. politics and imagine that voters are policy-obsessed wonks who
somehow just test badly when asked political questions by researchers.
Something else must be going on. Political scientists have spent the last
fifty years trying to identify what that something else is.
B. All in the Family: The American Voter and Party Identification
One model of voters and parties has achieved dominance in legal
scholarship. Developed by Anthony Downs, it posits that political par-
ties compete by proposing policies along a right-to-left axis, and that vot-
ers select the candidate of whichever party comes closest to their prefer-
ences along the same axis.' In a two-party race, the parties will converge
as the party that wins the voter in the middle will have won fifty percent
plus one of the votes, and hence the election. This is the famed median
voter hypothesis.3 2
Downs's model fit with the dominant understanding of party behav-
ior at the time, the Responsible Party Government (RPG) school. This
project, which began with the work of Woodrow Wilson and Frank J.
Goodnow at the turn of the twentieth century, reached its apex in the
knowledge of Supreme Court than conventional survey questions reveal); Markus Prior & Arthur Lu-
pia, Money, Time, and Political Knowledge: Distinguishing Quick Recall and Political Learning Skills,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 169, 170 (2008) (giving respondents more time improves answers to political infor-
mation questions by eleven to twenty-four percent). But see Robert C. Luskin & John G. Bullock,
"Don't Know" Means "Don't Know": DK Responses and the Public's Level of Political Knowledge, 73
J. POL. 547 (2011) (showing with experiments that conventional survey items do not underestimate
voters' working knowledge).
29. See, e.g., Somin, supra note 2, at 1305-06.
30. Bryan Caplan's fascinating book compared beliefs about economic issues and found that
they were at odds with those of professional economists who share the voter's ideology and demo-
graphic profile. See BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 50-93 (2007).
31. DOWNS, supra note 18, at 115-22.
32. Id.; Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 428-29.
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1950s in the work of Austin Ranney and E.E. Schattschneider.3 RPG
scholars argued voters could only contribute to governance in a compli-
cated modern democracy if political parties presented clear platforms
and had enough internal coherence to bring them about upon winning
control of the government.3 4 Such "responsible" parties were a precondi-
tion for meaningful voter participation, as large masses of people could
never sift through the gamut of policy alternatives." "The people are a
sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to two words, 'Yes' and 'No."'"6
But Downs and the RPG school still assumed a lot: that voters have
well-formed policy preferences, that voters observe the policy outputs of
government, and that voters make neutral assessments of facts and credit
or blame the responsible governmental actors." Confidence in these as-
sumptions took a blow with the publication of The American Voter.
The American Voter was-and probably still is-the single most im-
portant book ever written about voting in the United States.38  Marshal-
ing the results of the first nationwide voter surveys, Angus Campbell,
Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes concurred that par-
ties are the key to voter decision making, but rejected the Downs/RPG
hypothesis that voters choose their party on policy grounds." Rather, the
voter of The American Voter is effectively tribal in his partisan allegianc-
es. Partisanship is pre-political; a "psychological identification" more
than an intellectual one.40 One's parents, most importantly, and later
one's friends and social cohort, drive the decision to identify with a polit-
ical party.41
33. For a history of the work on Responsible Party Government, see AUSTIN RANNEY, THE
DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT (1962). For its most famous distillations, see
SCHATISCHNEIDER, supra note 4; AM. POLITICAL SCL ASS'N, COMM. ON POLITICAL PARTIES,
TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM, at vii (1950).
34. See RANNEY, supra note 33, at 9.
35. See SCHATTSCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 52.
36. Id.
37. See Somin, supra note 2, at 1298-1300.
38. The American Voter drew on, but departed substantially from, the first substantial studies of
voter behavior, done by scholars who have come to be known as the Columbia School. See BERNARD
R. BERELESON ET AL., VOTING: A STUDY OF OPINION FORMATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
(1954); PAUL F. LAZARFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER MAKES UP His MIND
IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (1944). Although largely similar in their findings to the Michigan
School scholars who came later, the Columbia School emphasized the degree which social characteris-
tics (income, gender, labor union membership, ethnicity, etc.) predict voting patterns, which interest-
ingly caused pollsters to avoid late polling during the Truman-Dewey election of 1948 (and led to them
getting the election wrong). See THEODORE ROSENOF, REALIGNMENT: THE THEORY THAT
CHANGED THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT AMERICAN POLITICS 58-68 (2003). The American Voter dif-
fered from this by treating party membership as an independent social characteristic, like a religion
itself.
39. CAMPBELL ETAL., supra note 1. at 542-44.
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id. at 162-65. One of our favorite recent papers addressed the finding that parental ideology
had a strong effect on their children. Elias Dinas found that parental party identification is transmit-
ted to children, but interestingly that the more politicized parents are, the less likely the child is to
have the parents' ideology. The intuition is that parents both transmit a party identification and, con-
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Partisan ties once formed-"party identification" or "party ID" in
the nomenclature of the book and henceforth in the political science lit-
erature-exert a powerful pull on voters' choices and even their opinions
on issues.42 The American Voter found that party ID better predicted
vote choice than the individual's assessment of the candidates.43 This was
a stark discovery: people who identified as Republicans were more likely
to vote for President Eisenhower than were people who said they had a
favorable impression of President Eisenhower."
The American Voter acknowledged that some people who identify
with one party occasionally vote for candidates of another, but the vast
majority vote the party line virtually all the time.45 Only major realigning
elections and social shifts change party identification. 46  Party identifica-
tion is the "unmoved mover" of everything else that happens in politics.47
Opinions on issues are largely epiphenomenal, a consequence rather
than a cause of party identification. 48
But what about vote switchers? The American Voter showed that
the citizens most likely to support candidates of different parties from
one election to the next were the least informed. 49  This directly chal-
lenged the RPG view of elections as searching referenda on government
performance. 0
sistent with stories discussed below, an interest in politics. Children from more political families up-
date their preferences more often and, as a result, veer from parental party identification at a higher
rate. Elias Dinas, The More You Try the Less It Sticks: Parental Politicization and the Endurance of
Partisan Transmission Through the Family 3, 5 (APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id1451307.
42. CAMPBELL ETAL., supra note 1, at 121.
43. Id. at 74.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 138-41 ("Of course, the influence of party identification on perceptions of political ob-
jects is so great that only rarely will the individual develop a set of attitude forces that conflicts with
this allegiance.").
46. Id. at 151. This drew directly on arguments by Samuell Lubell and V.0. Key that there were
"realigning" elections in American life. SAMUEL LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(1952); V.0. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3 (1955); V.0. Key, Jr., The Future of
the Democratic Party, 28 VA. Q. REv. 161, 163-64 (1952). Elections during great periods of strife, like
1898 and 1932, did more than sweep one party into power; they set up patterns of voting that would
last for decades. The American Voter provided a micro explanation for this macro theory-voters
made up their minds and then party identification colored their votes and thoughts until their group
identity was shaken by another titanic election. This led to a very long literature on what constituted a
realigning election. For an excellent discussion of the idea of realignment, and The American Voter's
role in it, see ROSENOF, supra note 38.
47. Thomas M. Carsey & Geoffrey C. Layman. Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identi-
fication and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SC. 464, 465 (2006) (charac-
terizing The American Voter thus: "[P]arty identification is an 'unmoved mover:' a deeply held psycho-
logical attachment that is (1) largely unchanging over time even as events change, and (2) a filter
through which citizens view and interpret new political information. From this perspective, party iden-
tification shapes policy preferences and other political attitudes, but is largely unchanged by them.").
48. Id.; Phillip Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY AND
DISCONTENT206-56 (David E. Apter ed., 1964).
49. See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 143.
50. Id.
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The American Voter was (and is) a difficult pill to swallow for any-
one committed to the democratic idea. But it made sense in context of
its time." Political parties in the 1950s and early 1960s were not nearly as
coherent ideologically as parties today," yet the parties had intensely
loyal followings nonetheless.S3
C. "A Reasonably Rational Fellow": The Running Tally, the Miracle of
Aggregation, and Macropartisanship
The American Voter dominated the field for more than twenty
years, and it remains the central text for those studying voting behavior
in the United States.54 Indeed, it was so dominant that, many years later,
Morris Fiorina said he "distinctly remember[ed] a feeling of mild anxie-
ty" when he first ran a regression with party identification as the depend-
ent variable."5 But Fiorina pressed on and developed a model that at-
tempted to reconcile the data in The American Voter with the work of
Downs and the RPG school.
Fiorina argued that generally inattentive voters can develop a de-
cent understanding of what parties do and stand for by incorporating
their stray observations about politics and policy into a "running tally"
assessment of the political parties.5 6 Party identification is simply a life-
long sum of the pluses and minuses a person observes about the perfor-
mance of political parties. As long as the parties are consistent over
time, one's running tally provides a serviceable guide to voting deci-
sions." Fiorina's data showed that party identification and voting pat-
terns moved over time, if slowly, and his theory provided an explanation
for this finding. 8
Far from the unquestioning ignoramus of The American Voter, the
ordinary voter per Fiorina is "a reasonably rational fellow."" He does
not know much about today's hot political issues, but his judgment about
the political parties adds usefully to the project of self-governance.o
Christopher Achen formalized this model, arguing that the voter starts
51. It certainly reads like a document from the 1950s. Particularly, the dimestore Freudian anal-
ysis jumps off the page. "As the young adult passes through the early egocentric years, however, the
salience that political matters have in his life gradually increases." Id. at 164.
52. See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 24-27 (2008).
53. NORMAN H. NIE ET AL., THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 28-35 (1999).
54. See Morris P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, 24 POL. BEHAV. 93,
97 (2002). The American Voter did face criticism from some prominent political scientists, notably
V.0. Key. See V.0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECrORATE: RATIONALITY IN PRESIDENTIAL
VOTING 1936-1960 (1966).
55. Fiorina, supra note 54, at 98-99.
56. MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 89-105
(1981).
57. Id. at 83.
58. Id. at 129.




with her parent's preferences and updates them in a Bayesian fashion.
The more observations she makes, the firmer her party identification.61
Achen's formalization proved that the stylized facts of The American
Voter-the widespread lack of knowledge of today's issues, the con-
sistency between the political beliefs of parents and children, the harden-
ing of party identification over time, and the correlation between a lack
of information and weak partisan attachments -were compatible with a
world in which policy observations rather than group attachments are the
key determinant of voting behavior. Experimental work by Milton
Lodge and others added to the project by showing that voters exposed to
campaign stimuli base their judgments on much more information than
they can subsequently recall.62 Survey-based measures of political
knowledge miss the latent "tally" on which voters rely.
Fiorina's work highlights the importance of political parties and par-
ty labels for competent voting. It must be clear to voters which party is
in charge so that they can link their policy-outcome observations to a
party. Party positions and objectives must be reasonably consistent over
time, so that the running tally actually differentiates the parties. Party
labels must be assigned to candidates in a reliable fashion, lest voters be
misled about what a candidate stands for. And the parties' endorsements
must be known to the voter when she makes her decision. Clear and
consistent party labels enable low-information voters to play a meaning-
ful role in elections.
For our purposes, this is the key point: uninformed voters need
tools in order to turn their retrospective (or prospective) policy evalua-
tions into votes. And, as we argue in Part II, state and federal law de-
termines the availability and quality of those tools.
Fiorina's model was not the only challenge to The American Voter
consensus.63 Samuel Popkin and Donald Wittman argued that voters get
all sorts of politically relevant information from daily life, without a vote-
motivated search. Everything from buying gas to paying taxes exposes
citizens to policy-relevant information, resulting in a better-informed
61. Christopher H. Achen, Parental Socialization and Rational Party Identification, 24 POL.
BEHAV. 151, 153-67 (2002); Christopher H. Achen, Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and
Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research, 14 POL. BEHAV. 195, 200-04 (1992).
62. See, e.g., Milton Lodge & Charles Taber, Three Steps Toward a Theory of Motivated Political
Reasoning, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 183-
213 (Arthur Lupia et al., eds., 2000); Milton Lodge et al., The Responsive Voter: Campaign Infor-
mation and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 309 (1995); Milton Lodge &
Ruth Hamill, A Partisan Schema for Political Information Processing, 80 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 505
(1986).
63. Notably, many books of this type came with extremely uncreative titles modeled on
CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 1. They read like a bad game of Mad Libs with the clue "The (Adjec-
tive) Voter." See, e.g., D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS & TODD G. SHIELDS, THE PERSUADABLE VOTER:
WEDGE ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2008); NIE ET AL., THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER
supra note 53; SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 22-26 (1994). Were we political scientists, this Article would surely be
entitled, "The Legal Voter" or, if we only wanted to break out a little, "The Voter-In-Law."
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electorate than one would expect based on the instrumental value of vot-
ing.' Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James Snyder re-
cently revisited the evidence of consistency and constraint in policy opin-
ion." They argued that The American Voter's conclusions were likely
due to measurement error, and that the simple corrective of measuring
issue preferences by averaging across multiple survey items yields a pic-
ture of the ordinary voter as reasonably consistent and ideologically con-
strained in his policy opinions."
Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins deduced a series of proposi-
tions about how voters with little information about the issues could rely
on cues provided by interest groups as well as parties.67 A rational citizen
who understands the cue-givers' interests, informedness, and incentives
for truth-telling can position herself between cues, as it were, and make
decisions that are much like those of voters with detailed policy
knowledge."
Finally, much revisionist work has centered on the aggregate com-
petence of the electorate. Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro pointed
out that bits of information that register with a few voters will nonethe-
less move mass opinion so long as unobservant voters stay constant in
their views, or shift their views in some random, uncorrelated fashion.69
Moreover, the famed Condorcet Jury Theorem shows that a mass of in-
dividuals each of whom has only a slightly better than fifty-fifty chance of
getting the right answer to a question will collectively get the answer
right almost one hundred percent of the time, so long as the individuals
act independently of one another. 0 This has become known as the mira-
cle of aggregation: acting together, even barely informed individuals can
function as a well-informed collective.
64. See POPKIN. supra note 63, at 22-28; DONALD WITTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC
FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 11-12 (1995).
65. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Pref-
erence Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting, 102 AM. POL. SC. REV. 215 (2008).
66. Id. at 216; see also Boris Shor, All Together Now: Putting Congress, State Legislatures, and
Individuals in a Common Ideological Space to Assess Representation at the Macro and Micro Levels
11-12 (Apr. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1697352 (using Bayesian ideal point estimation and surveys of voter policy
preferences to show that public opinion is ideologically constrained, with a dominant first dimension).
67. ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEw D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS
LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNow? 69-77 (1998).
68. Id.
69. BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 15-26 (1992).
70. Id. at 26. Of course, Page and Shapiro note that the errors voters make are not uncorrelated.
Correlated errors, however, do not destroy the Condorcet result but the more correlated vote patterns
are, the better voters have to be on average. See Krishna K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem,
Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. SC. 617, 632 (1992). For a formal extension of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem to majority rule in an electorate made up of competing groups, see Nicholas
R. Miller, Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING 173 (Bernard
Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986).
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Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson turned
these insights into a massive research project on how the electorate pro-
cesses political information." Acknowledging that most voters are unin-
formed and static in their preferences, Erikson et al. showed in The Mac-
ro Polity that the national electorate as a whole shifts partisan
preferences in response to real-world political and economic events.72
Enough voters respond to political inputs for "macropartisanship" to re-
semble Fiorina-style updating, notwithstanding that many voters are
Michigan types.
Fiorina and the aggregation literature created a clear micro- and
macro-level theory that could restore a general faith in democracy, de-
spite widespread voter ignorance of politics. Their work since has come
under fire, as the next Section explains. Regardless of who is right,
though, their work reflected its times much as The American Voter spoke
of its own. Voters in the highly-charged world of the late 1960s and
1970s seemed more informed and inflamed by politics than in the staid
1950s. The parties were also weaker, particularly after Watergate, with
party-line voting in Congress falling to all-time lows and candidate-
centered campaigns on the rise." Research on voting followed suit, treat-
ing voters not as blind partisans but, particularly in the aggregate, as ra-
tionally responsive to events and policy decisions. The world, however,
did not stand still, and neither did the literature.
D. "Partisan Hearts and Minds": Dissent from the Running Tally and
Macropartisanship
If the 1970s was a period of decline for parties and partisanship in-
side legislatures and among voters, the recent era has seen an enormous
revival. In a trend that started in the 1980s, the parties became more
ideologically distinct from one another, party-line voting in Congress be-
came more consistent, and voters became less likely to vote against their
long-run party identification or to split their tickets. 74 This change in ex-
perience has been matched by a change in views, with political scientists
and economists attacking the "voter [or electorate] as a relatively rea-
sonable fellow" synthesis of the 1980s.7 1
Larry Bartels challenged the miracle of aggregation by documenting
gaps between the actual vote shares of presidential candidates and the
vote shares one would expect from a well-informed electorate.7 1 (He cal-
71. ROBERTS. ERIKSON ET AL., THE MACRO POLITY (2002).
72. Id. at 117-24, 230-35.
73. Fiorina, supra note 54, at 94-99.
74. Id. at 99-103; MATTHEw LEVENDUSKY, THE PARTISAN SORT: How LIBERALS BECAME
DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 1-2 (2009); Larry M. Bartels, Partisanship
and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996,44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 35,44 (2000).
75. See KEY, supra note 54. at 40.
76. Bartels, supra note 6.
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culated the latter using the reported votes of high-knowledge individuals
and normalizing for population traits.") Donald Green, Bradley
Palmquist, and Eric Shickler went after the statistical underpinnings of
The Macro Polity; their models suggest that macropartisanship is much
less responsive to economic conditions and public policy." This occa-
sioned an impassioned response from the authors of The Macro Polity."
The debate is ongoing and feverish.
The assumptions behind the micro- and macro-stories about voter
competence also have been challenged. The optimists supposed that
voters independently and fairly assess whatever new information they
acquire and attribute policies and policy results to the proper politicians
or institutions." But party identification affects voters' perceptions of
the facts. For instance, many voters of both parties got the answer wrong
when asked whether the budget deficit increased or decreased during Bill
Clinton's eight years in office (it decreased a lot) but there was a system-
atic partisan difference, with fifty-two percent of Republicans thinking it
increased, compared with thirty-two percent of Democrats.81 The same
thing in reverse was true for evidence of reduced unemployment and in-
flation under Reagan.82 Further, shocks to partisan affiliation affect issue
stances, with voters who became Democrats after Watergate becoming
more liberal across a range of issues." Rather than adding information
neutrally to running tallies, voters conform their beliefs to their partisan
identification. They have, as Green and his co-authors put it, "partisan
hearts and minds."
They are also shortsighted. Presidents facing reelection are assessed
largely on income growth during the election year (and to a lesser degree
on income growth during the year before the election year) and not at all
on income growth in the first two years of a presidency.85 Some discount-
ing of the early part of a presidential term may be warranted, but failing
to take it into account at all is myopic.
Finally, voters often lack the basic information about institutional
77. That is, he showed that low-information voters with given demographic traits (class, race,
religion, etc.) voted differently from high-information voters with the same demographic traits. Id. at
206.
78. DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE
SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS, at vii-viii, 85-108 (2002).
79. ERIKSON ET AL., supra note 75, at 142-45; Robert S. Erikson et al., What Moves Macroparti-
sanship? A Response to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 901 (1998).
80. See PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 69, at 383-90; Popkin, supra note 63, at 31.
81. See Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions, 24
POL. BEHAV. 117, 134 (2002); Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, It Feels Like We're Think-
ing: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy 12-13 (Aug. 28, 2006) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-bartels/papers.
82. Bartels, supra note 81, at 134.
83. Achen & Bartels, supra note 81, at 29-31.
84. GREEN ET AL., supra note 78.
85. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW
GILDED AGE 100-04 (2008).
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responsibility and political control required for running-tally decision
making. For instance, a poll taken immediately after the 2002 election
revealed that only a third of all Americans knew that Republicans had
controlled the House of Representatives prior to the election.8 And
knowledge of party control without knowledge of responsibilities isn't
much help-it could result (for example) in voters blaming the President
for unemployment caused by the Federal Reserve? When voters credit
or blame politicians for events beyond their control, both individual and
aggregate running tallies become pointlessly volatile.
Using a variety of natural experiments, political scientists and econ-
omists have demonstrated that people lay credit or place blame on elect-
ed officials for all sorts of exogenous events. Voters in oil-producing
states give governors credit for increases in the world price of oil, even
though there is no plausible argument that gubernatorial policies affect
the global oil market." State-level incumbents generally benefit from na-
tional economic booms." Conversely, incumbents pay a price for such
random adversities as shark attacks," floods,91 and tornadoes.' A partic-
ularly entertaining study documents the combined effect of myopia and
misattribution: incumbents get a significant boost when the home team
wins a college football game the Saturday before an election.93
Yet a closer look at these studies reveals that voters are less hapless
than they first appear. Voters give state politicians less credit for nation-
al and international booms than local ones, and voters "show partial suc-
cess in not attributing blame for economic downturns to governors dur-
ing national recessions." 94  As Justin Wolfers notes, this makes voters
"[airguably ... as successful at this task as corporate boards are when
setting CEO compensation."95 Following floods, voters are highly sensi-
tive to the success of relief efforts, with incumbents faring far better
86. Somin, supra note 2, at 1305.
87. DELLI CARPINI & KEETER, supra note 22, at 69-71 (finding that voters lack much knowledge
about legislative and political processes).
88. Justin Wolfers, Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections (Jan. 30, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ecl/stabus/1730.html.
89. See Andrew Leigh & Mark McLeish, Are State Elections Affected by the National Economy?
Evidence from Australia, 85 ECON. REC. 210 (2009).
90. Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to
Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks (Estudio Working Paper, 2004/199, 2004), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65097_index.html.
91. Shawn A. Cole et al., Do Voters Appreciate Responsive Governments? Evidence from Indian
Disaster Relief, (Harvard Bus. Sch. Working Paper, No. 09-050, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1276339.
92. Andrew Healy & Neil Malhotra, Random Events, Economic Losses, and Retrospective Vot-
ing: Implications for Democratic Competence, 5. Q.J. POL. SC. 193 (2010).
93. Andrew J. Healy et al., Personal Emotions and Political Decision Making: Implications for
Voter Competence 2 (Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2034, 2009), available
at https://gsbapps.stanford.edu/researchpapers/detaill.asp?Document-ID=3269.
94. Wolfers, supra note 88, at 2.
95. Id. at 1.
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when they respond well to the crisis."6 Voters reward disaster relief
spending on tornados, with strong responses leaving politicians better off
than if no tornado had occurred.'
Even the overwhelming recent polarization of political parties has
been given a soft rationalist spin. In his recent book, The Disappearing
Center, Alan Abramowitz argued that although most citizens are centrist
in their beliefs, most engaged voters are not, and political leaders are re-
sponsive to the engaged part of the electorate.9 8 The increased polariza-
tion among regular voters reflects a greater correlation between educa-
tion and political participation; educated voters are more likely to have
ideologically coherent preferences." Meanwhile, the emergence of stark
party-based differences in candidate positioning has increased turnout
and made voting decisions easier (as predicted by the RPG scholars).tu
Far from being a sign of irrationality, polarization per Abramowitz is
both a consequence and a cause of increased voter rationality. 01
The latter point is backed up by Richard Lau and David Redlawsk's
work on "correct voting" in presidential elections.'" Lau and Redlawsk
use experimental and econometric techniques for determining whether
stated voter preferences about issues match voter preferences about can-
didates. They code a candidate preference as incorrect when it contra-
dicts the voter's issue preferences. Voters frequently support the wrong
candidate, as many as forty-nine percent in some presidential years. 3
The last election, however, in Lau and Redlawsk's study-heavily polar-
ized 2004-was the best ever for correct voting, suggesting that clear
choices can help voters overcome their ignorance.iM
Who has gotten the better of the debate between running-tally and
macropartisanship scholars and their critics is still somewhat in question,
but a middle ground seems to be emerging. Some recent work suggests
that voters' partisanship tracks their (prior) policy preferences on the is-
sues most salient to them, whereas party ID determines policy prefer-
ences on low-salience issues.0 The American Voter Revisited, a recent
96. Cole et al., supra note 91, at 3.
97. Andrew J. Healy & Neil Malhotra, Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy, 103 AM. POL.
SC. REv. 387, 387-88 (2009). This has its own pathologies, however, as voters reward disaster relief
spending, but not spending on disaster prevention.
98. ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION,
& AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 34-57 (2010).
99. Id. at 120-27.
100. Id. at 158-60.
101. See id. at 120-27.
102. Richard R. Lau et al., An Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections,
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 395, 396-98 (2008); Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 6.
103. Lau et al., supra note 102, at 401.
104. Id. They find an ongoing correlation between candidates' distinctness from one another and
"correct" voting. Id. at 407; see also David R. Jones, Partisan Polarization and Congressional Ac-
countability in House Elections, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 323, 325 (2010) (finding that party polarization is
correlated with retrospective voting in Congressional elections).
105. See Carsey & Layman, supra note 47, at 464; see also Benjamin Highton & Cindy D. Kam,
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volume dedicated to the original authors, suggests that the "unmoved
mover" theory of partisan identification misses something, although par-
tisan identification is still quite sticky.t 0 Fiorina has joked,
the debate has struck me as reminiscent of the classic anecdote, the
punchline of which is 'Madame, we are only quibbling about the
price'. ... [Elven if 1980-ish statistical estimates of the responsive-
ness of individual-level party ID ultimately prove to be too high,
the 1990s critiques fall short of convincing me that party ID is an
unmoved mover... . Party ID may move slowly, but it moves.1"
Without resolving this internecine battle, we can draw a few lessons.
Voters make mistakes, both individually and in the aggregate. They
overrate the importance of recent periods, give politicians credit for the
wrong things, view facts through a partisan lens, and have some simply
outlandish opinions. The electorate is, however, nonetheless capable of
providing useful feedback when armed with clear party labels (and per-
haps other heuristics) that are consistent over time and available at the
moment of decision.1' Equipped with good tools, the electorate looks
responsive, if human, in its failings. This makes sense when you consider
how candidates and parties behave, generally treating the electorate like
it is a reasoning body, but also feeding its rationalizing (and just strange)
sides.
E. So What?
The political science of voter ignorance has engendered two kinds
of normative claims or projects. One consists of lamentations or celebra-
tions of how well democracy works.'" The other takes the form of pre-
scriptions to minimize the continued significance of ordinary elections
through sweeping constitutional reformso or heroic voter education pro-
The Long-Term Dynamics of Partisanship and Issue Orientations, 73 J. POL. 202 (2011); Rune
Slothuus, When Can Political Parties Lead Public Opinion? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 27
POL. COMM. 158 (2010).
106. MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED 134-35 (2008). The
book is amusingly organized to replicate the chapter structure of The American Voter, much like Liz
Phair's brilliant album Exile in Guyville matched the tracks of The Rolling Stones's Exile on Main
Street. See Greg Kot, Return to 'Exile' Liz Phair Takes to Stage As Her Once-Controversial Classic
'Exile in Guyville' Is Reissued, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2008, at C6 (noting that Phair described Exile in
Guyville as a track-by-track response to Exile on Main Street).
107. Fiorina, supra note 54, at 98-99; see also Bartels. supra note 6, at 194 (finding that aggrega-
tion reduces but does not eliminate deviations of actual vote from fully informed vote).
108. The importance of printing the label on the ballot itself-making it available to low-
information voters at the moment of decision -becomes clear when one examines the performance of
nonpartisan elections. See infra Part II.A.1.
109. Contrast the happy optimism of The Macro Polity with Larry Bartels's finding that U.S. Sen-
ators are completely unresponsive to the issue preferences of their poor constituents. See BARTELS,
supra note 85, at 101-15; ERIKSON ETAL., supra note 71.
110. Exemplars include Ilya Somin's fascinating series of arguments for smaller federal govern-
ment and aggressive judicial enforcement of rights with little concern for the "countermajoritarian
difficulty," and Ethan Leib's proposal for a new "popular branch" of government modeled on the jury.
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jects.1I The common theme in all these works is that the authors, grop-
ing for alternatives to the status quo, spend little time examining where
elections work comparatively well or poorly under the status quo.
Judgments about "whether democracy works," given what voters
know, are both irreducibly normative and hard to make. The political
science literature does, however, enable one to form reasonable conjec-
tures about which elections are likely to work relatively well or compara-
tively poorly. (Like many political scientists, we treat elections as per-
forming well insofar as they yield outcomes that resemble those that
would have resulted in a world of high-information, policy-and-
performance minded voters.) Once one sees the variation across elec-
tions and its likely causes, it becomes possible to identify small-bore poli-
cy reforms that show promise for improving the performance of those
elections most at risk of going awry due to voter ignorance. This is the
argument we develop in Parts II and III of this Article. Our central con-
tention is that law plays a tremendously important role in determining
whether everyday elections perform ordinarily well. This point has
largely escaped the notice of political scientists and law professors alike.
II. ELECTIONS AT RISK
The last Part surveyed the debate over how (and how well) voters
make decisions without much specific knowledge about policies and poli-
tics. As we saw, there is much disagreement about how voters behave,
how they process information, and the extent to which heuristics, like
party labels on the ballot, enable voters to reliably translate their obser-
vations into electoral feedback. But the canonical works have one im-
portant commonality: they focus on national politics and elections. The
circumstances of national elections are comparatively propitious for in-
formed voting. In national elections, voters have party labels on the bal-
lot that correspond to the main ideological divisions within the elec-
torate, that are associated with high-profile figures like the President,
and that are reasonably consistent over time.112 Elections that will de-
termine the presidency or control of Congress also receive relatively in-
tense media coverage."' And candidates and outside groups spend huge
ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT (2004); Somin, supra note 2; Ilya Somin & Neal Devins, Can We Make the Constitution
More Democratic, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 971 (2007).
111. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004).
112. See generally ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 98, at 84-120 (discussing increasing partisan-
ideological polarization).
113. See, e.g., MARTIN KAPLAN ET AL., LEAR CTR. LOCAL NEWS ARCHIVE, LOCAL NEWS
COVERAGE OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGNS: AN ANALYSIS OF NIGHTLY BROADCASTS IN 11 MARKETS 10-
11, 29 (2005), available at http://www.localnewsarchive.org/pdflLCLNAFinal2004.pdf (finding, in study
of local television coverage in 2004, that sixty-one percent of campaign stories were devoted to the
presidential race, while about one percent were devoted to state legislative races). Media coverage
affects the extent of voter ignorance. See Christopher Berry & William Howell, Accountability and
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sums of money to get their messages across.114 All of these factors help
voters to link their policy preferences and their observations of the world
around them to the choices they make in the voting booth.
This Part shows that the prospects for aggregate voter competence
in many other American elections are far worse. We argue, moreover,
that these elections suffer in part due to the choices states have made in
regulating the electoral process. Voter competence is endogenous to
election law.
This is so because election law influences both the availability and
the quality of party cues. Some elections are required by law to be "un-
labeled," i.e., conducted without political party designations on the bal-
lot, and as Part II.A explains, the available evidence suggests that these
elections work poorly. Initiative and referendum elections, most local
government elections, and primary elections fall into this category.
In other elections parties are present but dysfunctional, either be-
cause they are substantively "mismatched" to the issue space and elec-
torate for the government in question, because Bayesian voters do not
see the party brands in terms of their local content, or because an imbal-
ance of Michigan types essentially predetermines which party will control
the government. These problems seem to plague some state and many
local government elections. Though they are not at first glance legal
problems, we will argue that law has considerable potential to exacerbate
or ameliorate them.
A. Elections Without Party Brands: Nonpartisan, Primary, and Direct
Democracy Elections
Political scientists have studied the performance of nonpartisan
elections, primary elections, and ballot-initiative and referendum elec-
tions. What they have found largely confirms the hypothesis that party
cues play an absolutely central role in enabling citizens to choose ideo-
logically congenial candidates, and to hold the government accountable
for performance.
1. Nonpartisan Elections
The laws governing many state and local elections bar any reference
to political parties on the ballot. Nearly seventy percent of American cit-
ies have nonpartisan elections, as do almost all other local governing
bodies, like school boards."' A majority of judicial elections are nonpar-
Local Elections: Rethinking Retrospective Voting, 69 J. POL. 844, 845 (2007) (finding that voters in
school board elections took student performance metrics into account when they were heavily covered
in the media, but not when media coverage had died down).
114. Total spending in the 2008 election was more than $3 billion. Editorial, Letting Big Money
In, PHIL. INQ., Nov. 8,2009, at C4.
115. See Chandler Davidson & Luis Ricardo Fraga, Slating Groups As Parties in a "Nonpartisan"
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tisan,"6 and a number of other state officials around the country are
elected on a formally nonpartisan basis, ranging from the entirety of the
unicameral Nebraska legislature"' to the California State Superintendent
of Public Instruction."'
Virtually everything we know about these races indicates that voters
are harmed by the lack of relevant party information. Turnout is lower
in nonpartisan elections, and incumbents are stronger, suggesting that in-
formed voting is costly and voters rely more on name recognition and
familiarity when denied information about party."9 Voters deprived of
easy access to partisan cues also give much more weight to candidates'
race, ethnicity, religion, and social status.12 0
Voters in formally nonpartisan elections do respond to evidence of
candidates' party membership-if they find out about it. For example, if
voters learn which governor appointed a judge facing a retention elec-
tion, that signal of partisanship becomes the only variable that has a dis-
cernible effect on the election.12' Local political party organizations in
some cities make and disseminate candidate endorsements,'12 2 but many
voters don't hear the message. Minority parties consistently outperform
in nonpartisan elections, garnering more votes than would be expected
based on the fraction of the electorate that identifies with the party.123
This is the predictable consequence of holding elections under circum-
stances in which a large fraction of voters are likely to make the wrong
Setting, 41 WEST. POL. Q. 373 (1988).
116. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 689,725 (1995).
117. Gerald C. Wright & Brian F. Schaffner, The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Leg-
islatures, 96 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 367 (2002).
118. Brian F. Schaffner & Matthew J. Streb, The Partisan Heuristic in Low-Information Elections,
66 PUB. OPINION Q. 559 (2002).
119. Id. at 579 (comparing partisan and nonpartisan elections for statewide office); Brian
Schaffner et al., Teams Without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local Elections, 54
POL. RESEARCH Q. 7, 7-25 (2001) (finding in legislative races that in most cases turnout falls and in all
cases the effect of incumbency increases).
120. Gerald C. Wright, Charles Adrian and the Study of Nonpartisan Elections, 61 POL. RES. Q.
13, 13-16 (2008); see also Phillip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonpartisan Trial Courts: A Multivariate
Assessment, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 395, 430-31 (1984); Marsha Matson & Terri Susan Fine, Gender,
Ethnicity, and Ballot Information: Ballot Cues in Low-Information Elections, 6 STATE POL. AND
POLICY Q. 49 (2006): Peverill Squire & Eric R.A.N. Smith, The Effect of Partisan Information on Vot-
ers in Nonpartisan Elections, 50 J. POL. 169, 173-74 (1988). Regarding racial voting cues in nonparti-
san elections, see Christopher S. Elmendorf. Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitu-
tional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 377, 443-44 (2012) (citing and
describing studies).
121. Squire & Smith, supra note 120, at 177; see also Cindy D. Kam, Implicit Attitudes, Explicit
Choices: When Subliminal Priming Predicts Candidate Preference. 29 POL. BEHAv. 343, 344-45 (2007)
(reporting experimental results showing that introduction of party cue into judicial retention elections
negates the effect of implicit and explicit racial biases on vote choice).
122. See, e.g., Timothy B. Krebs, The Determinants of Candidates' Vote Share and the Advantages
of Incumbency in City Council Elections, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 921, 923 (1988) (mentioning the role of
the Democratic Party in formally nonpartisan Chicago elections).
123. Brian F. Schaffner et al., A New Look at the Republican Bias in Nonpartisan Elections, 60
POL. RES. Q. 240,240 (2007).
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choice relative to their underlying preferences.
The correlation between what candidates say when running for of-
fice and how they vote if elected is also weaker in the case of legislatures
elected on a nonpartisan basis. "Nonpartisan" legislators don't act as if
they were worried about ideological challengers who might hold their
feet to the fire, which is no surprise given the powerful incumbency ad-
vantage in nonpartisan elections.124
Nonpartisan elections also hinder retrospective voting because they
obscure the identity of the dominant coalition (if there is one) in the leg-
islative body, and because they deprive voters of a simple, ballot-based
indicator of whether a given candidate would join the dominant coalition
or work against it. As two leading researchers put it: "[N]onpartisan
elections effectively break the policy linkage between citizens and their
representatives."'25
Seth Masket's penetrating study of California legislative elections
during the era of "cross filing" well-illustrates the problem.126 From
1910-1952, California permitted candidates to seek the nomination of
more than one political party, and did not require candidates to list their
party affiliation on the primary ballot.127 Incumbent legislators regularly
sought, and won, the nomination of both political parties. The legislature
during this era was unproductive and corrupt. Powerful, well-organized
interests such as liquor distributors were well served, but broad ideologi-
cal visions left no mark on policy. Disappointed by the legislature's fail-
ure to adopt progressive New Deal policies, unions eventually turned to
the ballot initiative to force candidates' party affiliation to be printed on
the primary ballot.128 This seemingly trivial reform had sweeping conse-
quences. Primary voters quit nominating other-party incumbents. Law-
makers started facing general election competition. And the California
legislature soon looked, and behaved, like a normal legislature organized
on party lines.
What is striking about Masket's story is not only that legislative in-
dolence and graft flourished in the absence of party-enabled retrospec-
tive accountability, but also that the mass electorate was unable to figure
out the most rudimentary indicator of even incumbents' ideological ori-
entation-their party affiliation-until it was printed on the ballot.129
124. Wright & Schaffner, supra note 117, at 375-77.
125. Id. at 377.
126. SETH E. MASKET, No MIDDLE GROUND: How INFORMAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
CONTROL NOMINATIONS AND POLARIZE LEGISLATUREs 55-86 (2009).
127. Id. at 58-59.
128. Id. at 73.
129. To be sure, cross-filing had the effect of depriving party brands of much of their ideological
content. But the brands clearly retained some ideological content, as evidenced by the changes that
followed the reintroduction of party labels.
No. 2] 387
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
2. Primary Elections
Although cross-filing is not to our knowledge permitted in any state
legislative elections today, the problem of voter ignorance in primary
elections remains. The standard primary election is just a nonpartisan
election conducted with party-based restrictions on who may participate
as a candidate or voter. The exclusion of other-party candidates suffices
to avoid the farce that was California during the era of cross-filing, but it
does not help voters to make an informed choice among candidates will-
ing to affiliate with the party. And the available evidence suggests that
primary elections are at best a weak mechanism for selecting candidates
who are proximate to the median primary voter on the issues."
Much of what is known about primaries owes to research on con-
gressional elections, where voters are likely to be better informed than in
state or local primaries. Even so, the results cast serious doubt on the
idea that primaries are meaningful vehicles for representing eligible vot-
ers' policy preferences."' A massive survey of the ideological position of
House candidates from 1874 to 1996 concluded that virtually all candi-
date positioning was determined by the national parties, "moderating
very little to accommodate local ideological conditions." 3 2 Other empiri-
cal work suggests primary competition does not much affect the propen-
sity of Members of Congress to take extreme positions, i.e., to placate
their base.'33 And the form of the primary is not very consequential. De-
spite the conventional wisdom of the cognoscenti, there is little evidence
that using open primaries (in which independents may vote) or closed
primaries (which limit participation to party members) has any consistent
effect on legislator behavior.'3 Although there is some evidence that
goes the other way, particularly as to congressional districts whose
boundaries correspond to major media markets,'3  most research shows
130. Whether primaries are better for selecting candidates than the familiar alternatives-e.g.,
caucuses, smoke-filled backrooms-is a separate question and one we do not address. We only mean
to suggest that primaries do not do much to bring candidate positioning or official performance in line
with median party member preferences. This is a point that has important implications for legal aca-
demics' long-running debate over bipartisan gerrymandering. See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note
11.
131. Notably, there has also been a substantial decline over the last seventy or so years in the
number of primaries in seats featuring incumbents in both the Senate and the House. Stephen An-
solabehre et al., More Democracy: The Direct Primary and Competition in U.S. Elections, 24 STUD. IN
AM. POL. DEv. 190, 196-99 (2010).
132. Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 136, 136 (2001). In periods where the party system is less strong, candidates take ideological posi-
tions that fit their districts to a greater degree. Id.
133. Id. at 153; ERIC McGHEE, PUB. POL INST. OF CA., OPEN PRIMARIES (2010); Shigeo Hirano
et al., Primary Competition and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 5 Q. J. POL. SC. 169 (2010);
available at http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=904.
134. Eric McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator
Ideology (Oct. 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1674091.
135. See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 571,
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that the partisan makeup of a district has only a weak effect on the ideo-
logical voting patterns of representatives, beyond determining which par-
ty wins the seat.
In keeping with this finding, the authors of a painstaking study of
the content of House primary campaigns since 1970 discovered that a
huge majority of (increasingly rare) primary challenges to incumbents
had no ideological content at all."' They centered instead on ethical or
corruption scandals, the age of the incumbent, ethnic or geographic con-
flict inside a district, or redistricting.
Even when ideological competition occurs, there is little reason to
expect it to yield a nominee who represents the preferences of most
members of the party. There is a long-standing belief (although a dis-
puted one) among political scientists that primary electorates are more
extreme than ordinary party members, providing an advantage to more
radical candidates.17 To the extent it is true, this effect simply illustrates
a larger phenomenon inside primaries-whoever can get organized and
get voters to the polls wins. Masket has shown that candidates promoted
by strong in-party interest groups and factions dominate primary elec-
tions.' 8 Some of these groups are ideological, like the Lincoln Club, a
group of conservative Republicans in Orange County who organize to
elect the most conservative candidate possible in each district; others are
more personal machines, like the Allatorre-Torres machine on the
Eastside of Los Angeles or Maxine Waters's organization in South Los
Angeles.' 9 In either case, it is their organizational muscle rather than
their appeal to average voters in the district that counts.
The failures of primary elections are due to the fact that ordinary
party members lack the tools-specifically on-ballot heuristic guides to
candidates' issue stances and the performance of party factions-to turn
primary elections into meaningful instances of democratic control.
579-81 (2012) (showing that media-market congruence has a substantial effect on probability that
moderate congresspersons will be defeated in primary election); David W. Brady et al., Primary Elec-
tions and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?, 32 LEG. STUD. Q. 79 (2007)
(showing, in a study of U.S. House of Representative primary and general elections from 1958-1998,
that primary electorates favor more ideologically extreme candidates than the general-election elec-
torate, and that candidates generally respond by positioning themselves closer to the primary elec-
torate median); Marty Cohen et al., Without a Watchdog: The Effect of Local News on Political Polar-
ization in Congress (2004) (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association) (showing that effect of district partisanship on Member of Congress ideological position
is strongly conditioned by newspaper coverage, and, somewhat more weakly, by congruence between
congressional district shape and local media markets).
136. Robert G. Boatright, Getting Primaried: The Growth and Consequences of Ideological Pri-
maries 25 (October 16, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.clarku.edu/
departments/politicalscience/pdfs/boatright-sotp09.pdf.
137. See V.O. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 153 (1956) (arguing that
primary electorates are more ideologically extreme than party members generally). But see Austin
Ranney, The Representativeness of Primary Electorates, 12 MIDWEST J. POL. Sa. 224, 224 (1968) (chal-
lenging this view).
138. MASKET,supra note 126, at 8-10.
139. Id. at 116-29.
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Where primary elections constitute the only check on government per-
formance (i.e., in one-party cities and states), accountability and respon-
siveness will suffer.
3. Direct Democracy Elections
Initiative and referendum elections pose extraordinary challenges
for ordinary voters.'" In nonpartisan representative elections, citizens
deprived of the party label may rely instead on character judgments, or
on the candidates' position-taking with respect to a small number of poli-
cies about which the voter has well-formed beliefs, or on the candidates'
social-group or religious identities. Not so in initiative and referendum
elections, where the choice to be made is whether to enact a law (which
may address anything under the sun) rather than to elect a person.
Worse, initiative voters are asked to make these choices in an environ-
ment that discourages attention to tradeoffs and policy alternatives. 4'
Worries about voter competence in direct democracy are longstand-
ing.142 In the late 1990s, however, some political scientists developed a
revisionist and more optimistic outlook. The optimists' story draws on
several lines of research. One, on the logic and practice of voting based
on interest-group cues,'143 establishes that credible cues can in theory sub-
stitute for a detailed understanding of policy;'" that voters self-report fol-
lowing elite cues;145 and that the patterns of self-reported cue usage make
sense given respondents' stated party affiliations (e.g., Democrats follow
labor cues, and Republicans follow anti-tax cues).146 The second line of
research consists of case studies of prominent initiative and referendum
elections. The most famous of these studies, which investigated voter
support for five competing auto-insurance reforms, showed that citizens
who knew insurance industry positions but lacked detailed factual
knowledge about the measures voted similarly to citizens who possessed
140. This Subsection will focus on the problems voters face in discrete initiative and referendum
elections. The indirect effects, however, of direct democracy on the utility of the party cue in repre-
sentative elections also may be significant and adverse: the more law gets made outside of the legisla-
tive arena, the less it makes sense to blame the then-dominant party in the elected branches for out-
comes one does not like. Direct democracy also gives interest groups more power over the agenda in
candidate elections. See STEPHEN P. NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA: CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS,
AND BALLOT PROPOSITIONS 68-71 (2005).
141. Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking
by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 961-65 (2005).
142. SEAN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT
DEMOCRACY 7-8 (1998).
143. See note 57 and accompanying text.
144. LuPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 67, at 68-93: Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedi-
as: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
63, 66 (1994).
145. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 142. at 55-66.
146. Id. at 64.
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such factual knowledge.'47 The third line of research looks at the corre-
spondence between state policy as a whole and median voter prefer-
ences. An influential paper by John Matsusaka provided evidence that
states with the ballot initiative come closer to the median voter's fiscal
preferences than states without it.1'
Further research has, however, cast considerable doubt on the revi-
sionists' optimism. The question of whether policy is more or less con-
gruent with public opinion in initiative states has become the subject of a
running empirical debate.'49 The most recent and methodologically so-
phisticated investigation found that initiative states performed no better
than non-initiative states with respect to thirty-nine policies across eight
issue areas.'
Other research questions ordinary voters' ability to make sensible
choices based on simple cues in initiative elections. Voters may follow
unreliable cues,"' and ignore probative cues.15 2 More basically, voters
may be unaware of cue-givers' positions, or of the basis for trusting or
discounting them.
As Thad Kousser and Mathew McCubbins argue, the costs of get-
ting a measure on the ballot skew the direct-democracy agenda toward
policies that would yield concentrated benefits for a narrow segment of
the population and diffuse costs for everyone else.' Such measures do
not induce the well-organized, well-funded opposition campaigns needed
to disseminate and explain cues that counsel against a "yes" vote.'54
(Contrast healthy partisan elections, where the critical cues are provided
on the ballot, linked to the governing coalition's performance, reasona-
147. Lupia, supra note 144, at 63, 72.
148. John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years, 103
J. POL. ECON. 587 (1995).
149. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 148, 149 (2012).
150. Id. at 150.
151. Cheryl Boudreau, for instance, has shown that experimental subjects will rely on unreliable
opinion polls even when concurrently exposed to a cue-giver whom participants know to have the
right answer and an incentive to reveal it. Cheryl Boudreau, The Market for Political Information:
How the Consumption of Information Affects Citizens' Decisions 22-25 (Jan. 17, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1742556.
152. Craig Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett, and Mathew McCubbins studied a ballot proposition about
renewable energy and found no meaningful differences in voting patterns between voters who knew
the details of the measure itself, voters who knew the electricity industry's position, and ignorant vot-
ers. Craig M. Burnett et al., The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION LAW J. 305 (2010): see
also Craig M. Burnett, Informed Democracy? How Voter Knowledge of Initiatives Influences Con-
sistent Voting (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (finding low levels of cue knowledge, and little evi-
dence of such knowledge affecting vote choice, in other ballot-initiative election).
153. Kousser & McCubbins,supra note 141, at 951-57.
154. To be sure, there is considerable evidence that public opinion does coalesce in a sensibly
structured fashion during the course of well-funded campaigns over high-stakes ballot measures. This
is evident from studies of term limits and redistricting reform, which show voters to be responsive to
the positions taken by their parties. See BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 142, at 129-46: Caroline J.
Tolbert et al., Strategic Voting and Legislative Redistricting Reform: District and Statewide Representa-
tional Winners and Losers, 62 POL. RES. Q. 92, 92 (2009).
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bly consistent over time, and endowed with meaning by campaigning on
both sides.) The ballot initiatives most studied by academics address hot-
ly contested subjects like Prohibition and term limits."' But these elec-
tions, which featured robust campaigns and intense media coverage, are
unrepresentative of the universe of ballot initiatives.
In ordinary proposition elections, most voters seem to rely heavily
on the description of the measure on the ballot proper-and perhaps lit-
tle else.1 16 If the description suggests that the measure will move policy in
the direction the voter favors, she supports it; if not, she votes no. To the
extent that vote choice in initiative and referendum elections depends on
the measure's description on the ballot itself, we should be very worried
indeed. The ballot description is often drafted by a less-than-impartial
elected official."' Misleading descriptions can have large effects on vote
choice, even among voters who receive probative cues."'
The very complexity of ballot language can also foil the ordinary
voter. A study of 1200 state-level ballot propositions found that the av-
erage ballot question's complexity placed it beyond the reach of a mere
college graduate, and unlikely to be fully understood by more than twen-
ty-five percent of Americans.15 9
The bottom line is that a large swath of the electorate in typical ini-
tiative and referendum elections brings little policy or cue-based
knowledge to bear on their choice. They glean what information they
can from the ballot itself, and then take a stab at the question present-
ed."6 Yet the ballot does little to help voters to learn whether a measure
that "seems like a good idea," per its description on the ballot, actually is
a good idea relative to the voter's values.
155. See for example Bowler & Donovan's widely cited book, DEMANDING CHOICES, supra note
142.
156. See, e.g., Burnett et al., supra note 152 (finding no meaningful differences in support for re-
newable energy measure across high-information voters, cue-knowing voters, and other voters; across
all three groups, there was overwhelming support for the measure among voters who said they sup-
ported renewable energy even if electricity rates may rise, and overwhelming opposition among those
who disagreed); Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, The Case of the Stolen Initiative: Were the Vot-
ers Framed? (September 10. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1643448 (using survey experiments to demonstrate effect on public sup-
port of ballot-measure wording). Cf. BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 142, at 55-59 (finding that
self-interest had a much more powerful effect on respondents' position on a school voucher ballot ini-
tiative when respondents were provided with the proposition's ballot description and name, rather
than the name alone).
157. For instance, the California Attorney General writes ballot titles and summaries for ballot
initiatives. Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How Democratic Is It?, 64
MONT. L. REV. 35, 39-41 (2003).
158. Burnett & Kogan, supra note 156.
159. Shauna Reilly & Sean Richey, Ballot Question Readability and Roll-Off' The Impact of Lan-
guage Complexity, 64 POL. RES. Q. 59, 61-62 (2009).
160. Many voters say that they also review the official ballot pamphlet. especially for evidence of
elite endorsements, see BOWLER & DONOVAN, supra note 142, at 55-59. But survey respondents like-
ly exaggerate their use of this resource, just as they exaggerate voting.
[Vol. 2013392
INFORMING CONSENT
B. Elections With Dysfunctional Party Brands: Mismatch and Michigan
Problems in State and Local Elections
Though nonpartisan elections have problems, the simple corrective
of adding party labels to the ballot is not a miracle cure. This Section ex-
plains why the party-labeled ballot is often a less effective device for se-
curing representative and accountable government at the state and local
level than at the national level, for reasons that relate to-but go well
beyond-voters' relative lack of attention to lower levels of govern-
ment.161 Ironically, the party cue tends to be least reliable in lower pro-
file elections, where voters are most likely to be lost at sea without it.
(The principal alternative to electoral accountability at the subnational
level-exit, or "voting with one's feet"-is a costly substitute. 162)
In federal systems like ours with first-past-the-post elections, there
usually are two major parties, each of which wins a roughly equal share
of the vote in national elections.6 The voters who favor each party in
national elections, however, may be distributed very unevenly across the
country. In a world of highly informed voters and flexible parties, the
clustering of citizens by national party ID would not interfere with the
normal workings of partisan competition with respect to state and local
161. This Section extends and supplements the theory of mismatch first presented in Schleicher,
Why, supra note 2, at 447-65 and Schleicher, What If, supra note 2, at 139-48. Among other things, we
provide new foundations in behavioral research on voting and partisanship, and new evidence con-
cerning election and policy outcomes.
162. First, at the individual level, there are high transaction costs to picking up and moving in the
face of bad governmental policies, particularly for people who have made substantial location-specific
investments in their homes, workplaces, and social and professional networks. Second, when people
choose where to locate based on local governmental policies, this distorts land markets and agglomer-
ation economies, as it disturbs which individuals and businesses co-locate. See David Schleicher, The
City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1540-45. Finally, the substantial ag-
glomeration economies (or strong preferences for locating near certain combinations of individuals
and firms) we see in big cities also reduce the efficiency of sorting and exit as a producer of respon-
siveness and accountability in local government. Id. at 1535-40. As a result, exit produces a much
weaker constraint on big city politics than it does on smaller local governments. See David Schleicher,
I Would, but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit Nor Voice Substantially Limits Big City Corruption, 42
Loy. U. CHI. L. REV. 277, 279-84 (2010). As such, improving local elections is important despite the
ability of individuals to relocate. In a related vein, it has also been argued, most prominently by Paul
Peterson, that the threat of exit by residents and businesses explains the lack of meaningful partisan
competition in big city elections. The prospect of capital and resident flight is said to render local gov-
ernments incapable of redistribution, and the types of issues that local governments commonly en-
gage-what Peterson calls "developmental" and "allocational" policies-allegedly cannot give rise to
partisan conflict. See PAUL PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981). City governments, however, do in fact
enact redistributive policies; they are able to do so because of the stickiness of urban agglomerations.
See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS
AND THE COURTS 50-70, 98-105 (2011). And partisan cleavages certainly can form around develop-
mental and allocational issues, as is clear from national politics (e.g., environmental and education
policy) and from the ideological competition we see in high-profile mayoral races over issues like po-
licing, schools, and development. Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 430-37. In smaller places, local
issues may be easier to understand than national ones but, in big cities, policy issues are effectively as
complicated and distant from voters as national issues are.
163. This is a function of "Duverger's Law" and the median voter theorem. See Schleicher, Why,
supra note 2, at 428-30.
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governments. If a state or municipality had a median voter to the right
of the national median, for example, ordinary Downsian theory predicts
that the national center-left party would develop a more conservative
sub-brand specific to elections for local offices, tailored to the subnation-
al government's median voter. About half of the voters, upon seeing that
the formerly uncompetitive party now takes issues stances they prefer to
its opponent, would support it. No level of government should suffer
from uncompetitive elections for very long.
This, however, is just a theory. In fact, as we will show below, the
party that wins national elections in a state or locality frequently domi-
nates subnational elections in the same jurisdiction with little change in
voting patterns based on local or state factors. Voters' preferences about
President Obama, for instance, seem to be translated directly into their
votes for dog catcher, or city council, or state senator; the actual perfor-
mance of party-affiliated officials at the subnational level does not seem
to matter.
Whether the enormous potential of partisan elections for securing
responsive, accountable government is realized depends on three condi-
tions, which state and local elections often do not satisfy. First, the ideo-
logical signal conveyed by the major-party brands-what the brands sig-
nify about the policy positions of party-labeled candidates-must be well
calibrated to the issue-space and the electorate of the government in
question. We will call a failure of this condition party-brand mismatch.
Second, voters must see and respond to the jurisdiction-specific content
of the brand, rather than understanding the brand purely or primarily in
terms of events elsewhere. When voters instead understand local party
brands primarily in terms of position-taking or performance by the party
at another level, we will say that there is perceptual mismatch. Third,
Michigan Voters in the jurisdiction-people whose partisanship is affec-
tive rather than informational-must affiliate with each party in roughly
equal numbers.'" We will call a failure of this condition Michigan Voter
imbalance. These problems are related, but for expositional clarity, we
will treat them separately.
1. The Problems Defined
Before digging into evidence, let us first define the problems more
precisely and explain how they are likely to interfere with representation
and accountability in federal systems.
Party-Brand Mismatch. The potential of party labels to improve
voter competence depends on their substantive calibration to the issue-
space and electorate of the government to be elected. In a two-party sys-
164. Of course, one could say that party cues "function optimally" when there is no Michigan
Vote at all. But affective partisanship is a reality, so the most one can realistically hope for is that the
Michigan Vote will be self-neutralizing with respect to party control of the government.
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tem, party labels are well calibrated insofar as the issue positions embed-
ded in each major-party label (1) differentiate the parties with respect to
the issue-space; (2) track latent preference correlations across issues
within the electorate, such that most policy-minded voters, given full in-
formation, would have no trouble saying which party's agenda they pre-
fer; and (3) divide the electorate more or less evenly, such that the num-
ber of eligible voters who prefer one party's positions roughly equals the
number who prefer the other party's positions.65 In subnational elec-
tions, these conditions seem frequently unmet.
A few examples will make these abstractions and their relevance for
competent voting easier to grasp.
Imagine that half of the Democratic candidates running for city
council favor and half oppose a community policing initiative; Republi-
can candidates are similarly divided. On this issue, the party labels fail to
differentiate the parties. To the extent that this occurs, the labeling of
candidates with party brands will not enable voters to infer candidates'
likely positions and to vote accordingly.
Now imagine that most voters who support community policing also
favor a "look the other way" approach to nonviolent drug offenses. If
the parties were to bifurcate on community policing and drug policy, but
the Democrats favored community policing while the Republicans toler-
ated nonviolent drug offenses, we would have the second type of mis-
matched brand: differentiation would have occurred, but not in a manner
that helps voters decide which party to support because the bundling of
positions into party platforms goes against the grain of preference corre-
lations within the electorate.
The third variety of party-brand mismatch would arise if one party
took systematically extreme positions relative to the median voter in the
electorate (for example, fiscal policy positions that appeal only to voters
on the far left) and the other party positioned itself to appeal to all of the
moderates. Here party labels would differentiate candidates cleanly but
not usefully for the purpose of elections that properly determine the bal-
ance of power in government, i.e., legislative elections in districts whose
median voter is ideologically similar to the median voter in the polity. If
one party holds vastly more appeal for centrist voters than the other, the
former party will have a lock on what should be "swing districts," and by
extension on control of the government. The only elections that will
matter are the dominant party's primaries, and as we have seen, primary
elections are weak instruments of popular control.1'
Perceptual Mismatch. For a low-information electorate to perform
reasonably well, it is not enough that voters be provided with party-
165. This assumes a two-party system, rather than a multi-party regime with proportional repre-
sentation.
166. See supra Part lI.A.2.
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labeled ballots, and that the labels be ideologically calibrated to the is-
sue-space and electorate for the government in question. Voters in the
aggregate must also see and respond to the labels' government-specific
content. If voters do not know what the party labels signify about candi-
date positions on local policy disputes, policy-minded voters will not be
able to use the labels as shortcuts. Similarly, if voters cannot determine
(or have biased perceptions about) whether local, state, or national offi-
cials are responsible for certain policies or conditions, voters' "running
tally" evaluations of local (and national) party brands will be off.
Citizens who do not see the local content of major-party brands are
likely to rely on their national party preferences when voting. This is ra-
tional when there is a positive (even if weak) correlation between local
candidates' national party affiliation and local candidates' support for lo-
cal policies the voter favors.' 7
Michigan Voter Imbalance. The existence of Michigan Voters-
affective partisans whose voting decisions reflect their cultural ties to a
political party rather than the parties' positions and performance-
should not much impede representation and accountability if the number
of Michigan Voters affiliated with each party is roughly equal. Though
individual seats may be essentially preassigned to one party or the other
by a local predominance of affective Democrats or Republicans, the par-
tisan balance of power in the legislative chamber will generally be de-
termined by Bayesian updaters because Michigan types will cancel each
other out. This may be a fair approximation of how national politics
works.
But in subnational jurisdictions that are more Democratic or Re-
publican than the nation as a whole, the locally dominant party by na-
tional ID will probably enjoy a "Michigan bonus." To illustrate, imagine
an electorate divided 50:50 between pure Michigan Voters and pure
Bayesians, and 60:40 between Democrats and Republicans. If there is an
even distribution of Michigan types across parties, the Democrats will be
guaranteed thirty percent of the vote in each election (to the Republi-
cans' twenty percent), and the Republicans will need to win the "votes in
play"-the votes of people responsive to information-by a landslide
60:40 margin in order to make the outcome a tossup. The Democrats, un-
derstanding this, will not be too concerned about losing median-
Bayesian-voter support. The Michigan Voter imbalance gives them a lot
of slack.
167. Even for voters who do observe the doings of local party-affiliated officials, it is probably
rational to put some weight on the doings of national officials when judging the local content of the
party brand. The latter observations are not altogether irrelevant to the question of what local offi-
cials are likely to do with respect to issues found on both the local and the national policy agenda. But
if party cues are ever to realize their potential as sources of prospective guidance and enablers of ret-
rospective accountability in subnational jurisdictions whose median voter is unlike the national medi-
an, subnational electorates must be capable of seeing and responding to subnational party cues pri-
marily in terms of the doings of party officials at the level of government in question.
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We will have more to say in a moment about the probable causes of
party-brand mismatch, perceptual mismatch, and Michigan imbalances.
But it will be helpful first to survey the evidence of how state and local
government elections in fact perform. What evidence we have indicates
that they perform poorly, in ways that are suggestive of each of these
problems.
2. Empirical Findings
a. Evidence from Municipal Elections
If national political parties successfully rebranded vis-A-vis the issue-
space and local electorate in municipal elections-and if voters correctly
perceived the parties' local brands and voted accordingly-then one
would expect to see robust partisan competition in municipal elections,
with neither party enjoying long runs of dominance on city councils.
There should also be consistent policy changes whenever control of the
mayoralty switches from one party to the other. Yet in big city elections,
as one of us has elsewhere noted, we observe nothing of the sort.168
Most big American cities support Democratic candidates for Presi-
dent by huge ratios, and vote shares in city council races closely track the
presidential balloting.'69 City councils have been dominated by one party
not for the decade-long spans common in national and state legislatures,
but for spans of a half-century or more.170 The only big-city councils sub-
ject to oscillating party control are found in cities whose electorates are
pretty evenly divided in terms of national party identification. 71
The election of more candidates of a given political party, which at
the national level changes the direction of public policy, does not have
similarly consistent effects at the local level. In a study of close mayoral
races in Pennsylvania, Fernando Ferriera and Joseph Gyourko found no
effect of Democratic (as opposed to Republican) control on the size of
168. Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 419-20.
169. Id. at 419-20, 424, 438 n.65. Existing research does not provide point estimates of the effect
of party labels on vote choice in city council races, but a study of low-profile, multi-member school
board races in Pennsylvania is suggestive. See Marc Meredith & Jason A. Grissom, Partisanship in
Local Elections: Regression Discontinuity Estimates from Unconventional School Board Races (Sept.
21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.sas.upenn.edul-marcmere/working
papers/MeredithGrissomPartisanship.pdf.
Pennsylvania allows fusion candidates for school board. Using a regression discontinuity design to
control for candidate quality, Meredith and Grissom find that winning a second party's endorsement is
worth about fourteen to nineteen percentage points in vote share. Id. at 1. That is, a candidate run-
ning as the nominee of both parties realizes a vote-share gain of about fourteen to nineteen percentage
points, relative to the same candidate running as either the Democratic or the Republican nominee.
When interpreting this result, bear in mind that adding a "Democratic" ("Republican") label to a can-
didate who already bears the other party's label sends a much weaker signal to Democratic (Republi-
can) partisans than does adding a Democratic (Republican) label to an otherwise unlabeled candidate.
170. Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 438 n.65.
171. Id.
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local government, the allocation of local spending, or crime rates. 17 2 Sub-
sequent work on a national dataset of recent mayoral elections shows
that the election of a Democrat leads to reduced spending on public safe-
ty but no other consistent effects.13 This is direct evidence that the par-
ties do not have well-developed and differentiated local brands.'74
In summary, local elections appear to suffer substantially from mis-
match in party brands and in perceptions. The major-party brands con-
tain little meaning specific to local governments. Voters, discerning little
meaning, simply use their preferences about national politics when vot-
ing at the local level. 7 1
b. Evidence from State-Level Elections
While local elections have all the indicia of mismatch, the evidence
from state elections is a bit more complicated. Voting patterns and poli-
cy outputs speak to substantial mismatch in branding and/or perceptions.
But new research suggests that state parties do try to rebrand themselves
in the direction of the state's median voter.176 State electorates, however,
seem fairly unresponsive to these rebranding efforts. Consider the fol-
lowing:
Within-State Competitiveness Across Levels of Government. If the
major parties had well-tailored, state-level brands-and if state elec-
torates discerned and responded to those brands-then there should be
172. Fernando Ferriera & Joseph Gyourko, Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cit-
ies, 124 Q. J. ECON. 349 (2009).
173. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Daniel J. Hopkins, When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of
Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy, 55 AM. J. POL. Sci. 326 (2011).
174. To be sure, the evidence is also susceptible to other interpretations, for example, that local
elected officials have control over public safety spending but little else in most cities. See id. at 327.
Lest there be any confusion, it is not our view that the major-party brands are entirely uninformative
with respect to city elections. Indeed, a weakly positive correlation between national party ID and
local policy preferences is a necessary condition for the "party brand mismatch" story told below.
Two forthcoming studies based on roll-call votes and candidate and voter questionnaires speak to this
weakly positive correlation. One study examines recent roll call votes of the San Diego city council
and shows that, in the rare instances where council members defect from the dominant, bipartisan
governing coalition, Republicans generally defect to one side and Democrats to the other. San Diego
is an unusual city because the electorate itself is about evenly split between Democrats and Republi-
cans, giving the parties an exceptional incentive to develop locally meaningful brands. Craig M. Bur-
nett & Vladimir Kogan, Team Spirit: The Search for Party in Local Politics 19 (Nov. 1, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1701487. The
other study uses issue-position questionnaires to create same-scale measures of candidate and voter
ideology in the issue-space of San Francisco politics, and shows that the median Republican is some-
what to the right of the median Democrat (though there is lots of overlap between the parties in the
local issue space, unlike in national politics). Cheryl Boudreau, Christopher S. Elmendorf, & Scott A.
MacKenzie, Lost in Space?: Shortcuts and Spatial Voting in Low-Information Elections (Paper pre-
sented at the 7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Stanford Law School, Nov. 9, 2012)
(on file with authors).
175. Mayoral elections may be different than city council elections in this regard, because the of-
fice of mayor has a higher public profile and mayors may develop personal brands that differentiate
them from their party. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
176. See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
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greater within-state partisan competitiveness, on average, in elections for
state than for national office. To see this, imagine a very liberal state.
Few congressional districts in this state will be competitive because the
state's voters will overwhelmingly favor the national Democratic Party
on ideological grounds. But if the state Republican Party developed a
more liberal, state-level brand tailored to the state's issue space and elec-
torate, and if voters responded to that brand, then Republicans should
win (or be competitive in) roughly half of the state-level elections. Av-
eraged across the nation as a whole, then, within-state competitiveness
should be higher in state than in national elections. Yet the available da-
ta show precisely the opposite pattern: state legislative elections are less
competitive than national elections in the state."'
Vote Swings in State and National Elections. If state-level party
brands were well calibrated to state electorates-and heeded by voters in
state elections-then one would not expect to see swings in the vote
share of a given party in elections for state office closely track the vote-
share of that party in elections for national office. To be sure, leftward
or rightward shifts in the "public mood" ought to register similarly at the
state and national levels, but other factors should tend to differentiate
state and national election results. If Congress or the President moves
too far to the right or left, enacts an unpopular law, or simply performs
badly, state elections should be unaffected."' Nor should national-level
vote swings echo in the states when driven by issues for which the na-
tional government is principally responsible (such as foreign policy).
Yet as Figure 1 shows,'79 seat losses by the President's party in Con-
gress and in the lower house of state legislatures move in tandem. To the
extent that mid-term congressional elections are a referendum on the
President, the sentiments behind that referendum are just as forcefully
manifested in state legislative races.
177. Robert D. Brown & John M. Bruce, Political Parties in State and Nation: Party Advantage
and Party Competition in a Federal Setting, 8 PARTY POL. 635 (2002) (finding substantially more com-
petition in national than in state elections).
178. Here's another example. In national mid-term elections, there is evidence that the reason
voters "swing" away from the President's party at the national level is that moderates seek to achieve
centrist policy outcomes by strengthening the position of the other party in Congress. Joseph Bafumi
et al., Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm Congressional Elections. 72 J. POL. 705 (2010). This
should not matter in state elections.
179. Thanks to Steve Rogers for providing the data.
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Using recent survey data, Steve Rogers has shown why state legisla-
tive elections so closely track national elections: the "driving force in
[state] legislative elections"~ is approval of the President.8 o European po-
litical scientists have a name for this phenomenon: the second-order elec-
tion.181 A se cond-order election is one in which voters respond to candi-
dates, and candidates appeal for votes, on the basis of political
developments in a different arena. 82 In SOme settings this is healthy. For
example, it is a good thing for national political responsiveness that vot-
ers in mid-term congressional elections reward (punish) candidates of the
President's party if they like (dislike) the President's performance. This
is so because the issue-space over which each actor (the President and
Congress) has influence is quite similar; and because the President's abil-
ity to implement his or her agenda depends on the relative strength of
the President's party in Congress.
180. Steve Rogers, Collective Accountability in State Legislative Elections Obama: The State
Legislator People Vote Against 13 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
princeton.edu/~rogerssm/www/dissertation.html. Controlling for the state of the economy and many
other factors (including gubernatorial and state legislative approval), Rogers shows that a change from
"strongly disapproving" to "strongly approving" of the President changes the predicted probability of
voting for a candidate of the President's party in state legislative elections by at least forty percent. Id.
Rogers corroborates the survey results with aggregate data going back to 1972, and shows that the
President's party is punished in state legislative elections for poor economic performance. Id. at 15-
20.
181. The seminal paper is Karlheinz Reif & Hermann Schmitt, Nine Second-Order National Elec-
tions-A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results, 8 EUR. J. POL. RES. 3
(1980).
182. Id. at 8-15 (developing hypotheses about characteristics of second-order elections); SIoN
HIX, WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND How TO FIX IT 80-84 (2008) (regarding Eu-
ropean Parliament elections as second-order elections).
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But when party branding at a subnational (or supranational'm) level
of government with a distinctive issue-space and electorate is substantial-
ly determined by the party's national-level doings, partisan competition
will not yield its usual benefits at the "secondary" level. Lawmakers
whose hold on office at secondary levels is largely determined by their
party's performance at the national level have little electoral incentive to
govern effectively and in a manner responsive to the preferences of the
subnational median voter. European political scientists have shown that
both European Parliament and subnational elections in Europe are
largely "second order," and Rogers's work demonstrates that this holds
for U.S. state legislative elections are as well."
Policy Congruence and Partisan Competition. A third source of
doubt about the workings of major-party brands at the state level is Jef-
frey Lax and Justin Phillips's cutting-edge study of the "congruence" (fit)
between state policies and state public opinion. Across states, policies
track popular opinion very weakly: "Roughly half the time, opinion ma-
jorities lose-even large supermajorities prevail less than 60% of the
time. In other words, state governments are on average no more effec-
tive in translating opinion majorities into public policy than a simple coin
flip."8 6 Further, and contrary to expectations, Lax and Phillips found
that one-party dominance does not diminish congruence; states with
competitive elections are just as unresponsive to public opinion as one-
party states."87
Normally, greater competition should create pressure on incum-
bents to produce responsive policies. But this dynamic will not work at
the state level if vote swings in state elections are artifacts of national
politics, rather than being driven by the achievements and failings of the
state's governing coalition. Lax and Phillips's results therefore corrobo-
rate the hypothesis that state voters do not see and respond to state party
brands in terms of the parties' actual accomplishments at the state level.
There is, however, some evidence that state parties try to rebrand
by fielding more liberal candidates in liberal states, and conservative
candidates in conservative states. In the latest and best work on the sub-
ject, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty used roll-call votes and surveys of
183. The theory of second-order elections was developed in response to election to European
Parliament, in which national party preference determines almost all variation in elections to the su-
pranational Parliament. See Schleicher, What If, supra note 2, at 119-30.
184. Rogers, supra note 180, at 13-14.
185. Lax & Phillips, supra note 149, at 148.
186. Id. at 149 (reporting that one-party control bears on the direction of incongruence, but not
the amount).
187. Id. Other research has found evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the imminent pro-
spect of winning or losing control of state government induces lawmakers to invest in building
statewide party brands. See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? His-
torical Patterns in American State Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 151 (2010) (finding, in a study
of thirteen states over 120 years, that balance between "particularistic" (district oriented) and "gen-
eral" (issue oriented) policymaking shifts toward the latter when parties are evenly balanced).
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candidates to map the ideological position of every state legislator,
Member of Congress, and general election candidate into a single com-
mon space.11 Then, using survey-based estimates of voters' policy pref-
erences, Shor mapped each state's median voter into the same common
space,189 enabling a comparison of what politicians say (and how they
vote) with what voters say they want.
This research reveals considerable state-by-state variation in the po-
sition of the median legislator in the Democratic and Republican state
legislative caucuses, variation that is at least weakly correlated with pub-
lic opinion.'90 The median Democratic legislator in Mississippi, for ex-
ample, is actually to the right of the median Republican legislator in New
York, in keeping with the very conservative Mississippi electorate.'91 Not
all parties come near the median voter in their state, but some do.
The limited evidence on hand also suggests that some voters may
see and respond to positioning and other activities by state legislative
parties to some degree, though the effect on vote choice is modest. Brad-
ford Bishop and Rebecca Hatch find that voting in state legislative elec-
tions is affected not only by such extraneous factors as presidential ap-
proval, but also by voters' perceptions of their relative ideological
proximity to the state Democratic and Republican parties, and by their
approval or disapproval of the state legislature. 192 (Whether voters' per-
ceptions of state-party positions correspond to reality is not answered by
this work. 93 ) Rogers also finds that state legislative approval affects vote
choice in state legislative elections, although this effect is substantially
attenuated by voter confusion about which party has majority control of
the legislative body, and it pales in comparison to the effect of presiden-
tial approval.194
In a world where presidential approval and national party ID
strongly influence vote choice in state elections, there are clearly limits to
188. Boris Shor & Nolan McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures (Jan. 7,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1676863. Shor and McCarty build on a classic: ROBERT S. ERIKSON ET AL., STATEHOUSE
DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 96-119 (1993). Note that
these works assume that state and national politics have the same ideological structure, notwithstand-
ing that some issues (like foreign policy) are part of one issue-space but not the other.
189. Shor, supra note 66.
190. Shor & McCarty, supra note 188, at 19 fig.7.
191. Id.
192. Bradford H. Bishop & Rebecca S. Hatch, Perceptions of State Parties and Voting in Subna-
tional Elections 18-19 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://sites.duke.edu/
bradbishop/files/2012/11/sppq-7-4-12.pdf. In related work, they find that voters who perceive them-
selves as ideologically closer to different parties at different levels of government (e.g., Democrats at
the state level, Republicans at the national level) are much more likely than other voters to split their
ticket between levels of government. Bradford H. Bishop & Rebecca S. Hatch, Ticket Splitting in a
Complex Federal System 11 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://sites.duke.edul
rebeccahatch/files/2012/09fTicket-Splittingl.pdf.
193. Regarding the risk of mistaken perceptions, see infra Part II.B.3.b.
194. Rogers, supra note 180, at 12.
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what repositioning by a state legislative party can accomplish. Consider
the case of Massachusetts. Shor finds that the state's median Republican
legislator is extremely close to the median voter and that the median
Democratic legislator is way out in left field-yet Republicans have been
the minority party (and usually a very small one) in the Massachusetts
legislature continuously since 1958.91
To sum up: there is some evidence of ideological recalibration by
state parties to state electorates, but the stunning effect of presidential
approval on vote choice in state legislative elections, the strong correla-
tion between presidential party seat changes in Congress and in state leg-
islative chambers, the surprising shortage of competitive elections at the
state level, and the null effect of partisan competition on state-policy
congruence, all suggest that rebranding is at best incomplete-and at
worst largely irrelevant (as may result from mismatched perceptions
and/or severe Michigan imbalances).
3. The Mechanics of "Party Breakdown" in Subnational Democracies
We have identified three phenomena that can explain the stylized
facts of legislative elections at the state and local levels: mismatch in
branding, mismatch in perceptions, and Michigan Voter imbalances. It
remains to consider why these problems arise.
The first thing to observe is that the three problems are functionally
interrelated. Mismatched perceptions and Michigan Voting (based on
national party ID) in local elections would probably dissipate to some ex-
tent if the local wings of the national parties developed consistent, well-
tailored local brands. Eventually some citizens would see the local con-
tent of the party brands and start to vote accordingly. With the passage
of time, even affective ties to party would probably be influenced by lo-
cal branding.
Yet mismatched perceptions and Michigan imbalances are them-
selves impediments to rebranding. They reduce the electorate's respon-
siveness to the local content (if any) of the party brands, and the less re-
sponsive the electorate, the weaker the incentives for local party elites to
undertake rebranding. Substantial investments in rebranding will only
occur if local elites have very long time horizons, and believe that mis-
matched perceptions and Michigan imbalance would dissipate sufficient-
ly in the long run to make the local minority party competitive.
For these reasons, it does not make sense to think of mismatched
brands, mismatched perceptions, and Michigan imbalances as independ-
ent problems even though, as the balance of this Section will explain, cer-
tain forces may exacerbate or ameliorate each of the problems more or
195. MICHAEL J. DUBIN, PARTY AFFILIATIONS IN THE STATE LEGISLATURES: A YEAR BY YEAR
SUMMARY, 1796-2006, at 94 (2007).
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less independently of the others.'"
a. Michigan Voter Imbalance
Though the causes of Michigan-style party identification are not
well understood, an imbalance of Michigan types seems likely whenever
culturally and socio-economically similar voters congregate in the same
cities, suburbs, and regions. Citizens do seem to cluster in this way,m9 re-
sulting in an overwhelming predominance of Democrats or Republicans
(by national party ID) in some locales. There is some evidence that clus-
tering is growing,'98 and if some constant percentage of voters exhibit
Michigan traits, this trend means that the problem of non-self-canceling
Michigan Votes will make the general election pointless in an increasing
number of state and local governments, irrespective of rebranding by the
local minority party.
b. Mismatched Perceptions
Mismatch at the level of perceptions is also pretty easy to under-
stand. It can result from voters' sheer obliviousness to subnational polit-
ical events and governmental responsibilities, or from party-biased at-
tribution of responsibility among levels of government when different
parties control each level.
Voters in a federal system face competing demands for their politi-
cal attention. If national politics dominates media coverage and the po-
litical conversation-as is likely owing to the higher stakes of national
politics-the ideological meaning of party brands will probably be de-
termined by what voters observe about the parties at the national level."
For voters who are otherwise uninformed about subnational parties, it
will be rational to rely on the national party labels in subnational elec-
tions so long as there is at least a weakly positive correlation between na-
tional party membership and subnational-policy preferences.2 0
Voters may also revert to their national party preferences in local
196. There are corresponding opportunities for policy interventions, the topic to which we will
turn in Part IHl.
197. See BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS
TEARING Us APART 2-16 (2008); Ian McDonald, Migration and Sorting in the American Electorate:
Evidence From the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 39 AM. POL. REs. 512 (2011); Clay-
ton Nall, The Road to Division: Interstate Highways and Geographic Polarization (Nov. 14, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nalresearch.com/uploads/7/9/1/7/7917910/roadto
div.pdf. To be sure, there are some dimensions along which Americans are becoming less geograph-
ically clustered, such as race/ethnicity and family structure. See Charles R. Tittle & Thomas Rotolo,
Socio-Demographic Homogenizing Trends Within Fixed-Boundary Spatial Areas in the United States,
39 Soc. SCI. RES. 324,337 (2010).
198. See Tittle & Rotolo, supra note 197, at 336.
199. This is an assumption, but one with substantial support in the literature. See Schleicher,
Why, supra note 2, at 454-56.
200. Id. at 451.
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elections because they lack the minimum information required for retro-
spective voting at subnational levels. To vote retrospectively in state and
local elections, one must understand the partisan balance of power at dif-
ferent levels of government, and the distribution of public responsibilities
across governments. One must also link changes in social and economic
conditions to the responsible government. Voters have all sorts of trou-
ble with these tasks. 201
Further, the mistakes they make often run together in the aggregate
owing to partisan bias in perceptions. As Adam Brown has shown, when
the President and the Governor belong to different parties, voters rate
the relative performance of the state and national economies in line with
their partisan predispositions.20 That is, underlying "policy outcomes"
are perceived differently, depending on respondents' partisanship. Parti-
sanship also biases attributions of responsibility: good outcomes (in fact
or perception) are attributed to the level of government controlled by
the voter's party, whereas bad outcomes are blamed on the level of gov-
ernment controlled by the other party.2 03
The bottom line is that, owing to inattentiveness and/or biased per-
ceptions, voter perceptions of local and state party brands may have little
to do with the actual performance of officials and candidates at the cor-
responding level of government.
c. Party-Brand Mismatch and Barriers to Rebranding
When one party dominates a subnational government because of
residents' national political preferences, one might expect the local
branch of the national party that regularly loses elections to rebrand it-
self vis-A-vis the local median voter2? But political entrepreneurs who
201. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text. This is true at a level of government as well as
between levels-if voters blame Members of the House for actions taken by the Federal Reserve, for
example, accountability withers. See Fred Cutler, Whodunnit? Voters and Responsibility in Canadian
Federalism, 41 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 627, 650-51 (2008) (finding that with Canadian data, when compared
to the opinions of political scientists, ordinary citizens make systematic errors in attributing responsi-
bility to different branches of government); Bryan Caplan et al., Systematically Biased Beliefs About
Political Influence: Evidence from the Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey
(2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (finding that, when compared to the opinions
of political scientists, ordinary citizens make systematic errors in attributing responsibility to different
branches of government); Rogers, supra note 180, at 9, 12 (estimating that two-thirds of CCES re-
spondents were uncertain about party control of the state legislature, and that mistakes diminished the
impact of state legislative approval on vote choice in legislative elections by roughly fifty percent).
202. Adam R. Brown, Are Governors Responsible for the State Economy? Partisanship, Blame,
and Divided Federalism, 72 J. POL. 605 (2010).
203. Id. For a review of the literature on party-biased perceptions and retrospective voting, see
Christopher J. Anderson, The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of
Democratic Accountability, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 271, 278-8i (2007); see also Geoffrey Evans &
Mark Pickup, Reversing the Causal Arrow: The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions in the
2000-2004 U.S. Presidential Election Cycle, 72 J. POL. 1236 (2010).
204. One might also expect third-party entry, but there are almost no successful third parties in
local government elections in American cities. See Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 447. This is likely
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would carry out this rebranding confront a suite of challenges. Some of
these arise from legal regulations of the electoral process;2 05 others are
the result of regular facts about voter and candidate behavior that occur
whenever parties of the same name contest elections at different levels.
In the United States, as one of us has elsewhere argued, election law
unnecessarily unifies parties across levels of government. 206 Most signifi-
cantly, voter registration laws do not permit citizens to belong to differ-
ent parties at different levels of government.2' A New York City resi-
dent who is "center left" on the national political spectrum and "right"
on the city's political spectrum cannot register as a national Democrat
and a municipal Republican.
Unified registration rules make it hard for the local minority party
to field a competitive slate of candidates in municipal elections, since the
party's primary electorate is likely to be comprised entirely of voters on a
distant fringe of the municipality's ideological spectrum. 208 Unified regis-
tration rules also impede efforts to develop clear, differentiated party
brands on local issues that are orthogonal to or weakly correlated with
the main dimension of national politics. 2" For example, if half of the
Democrats and half of the Republicans in the New York City primary
electorate support community policing and the rest oppose it, the parties
are unlikely to develop clearly differentiated positions on this subject,
notwithstanding the strong divide within the electorate. If voters could
separately enroll in local and national parties, it would be easier for
community policing advocates to throw their weight to one of the parties
and for party leaders to recruit new registrants on this basis, reshaping
the primary electorate in the process.
due to many of the same forces that hinder major-party rebranding. discussed in this Section.
205. Here we touch briefly on certain election laws that may operate as barriers to rebranding.
We leave for another day an investigation of how the structural constitution (e.g., separated powers,
supermajority decision rules, the ballot initiative, term limits, redistricting) and legislative compensa-
tion may bear on party elites' incentive to develop competitive state and local sub-brands.
206. This argument draws on Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 450-51 (introducing the concept of
"Unitary Party Rules").
207. Here's another example: in many states, parties earn automatic ballot access for down-ballot
races-including races for city offices-through a strong showing in the gubernatorial race. Id. at 450
& n.108. Automatic ballot qualification makes it likely that the "number two" party in local elections
will be the locally disfavored national party, rather than a new entrant that lacks the baggage of the
locally disfavored national party. Once the locally disfavored national party is on the ballot at the lo-
cal level, it becomes harder for new entrants to attract voters and candidates.
208. Notably, this assumes that voters develop partisan identification on the basis of national, and
not local, issues, an assumption for which there is substantial evidence. Schleicher, Why, supra note 2,
at 454-57. It also assumes that the primary election outcomes are at least somewhat responsive to the
ideological makeup of the primary electorate, which is more doubtful. See supra Part II.A.2. This
second assumption, however, need only be weakly true for the argument to work. For primary and
registration laws to be a cause of mismatch, it only has to be the case that the absence of agreement
among party members on local issues negatively affects the party's ability to field candidates with con-
sistent, popular stances on local issues.
209. There are reasons to believe that most local government issues work this way. See Schlei-
cher, Why, supra note 2, at 437-44.
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In theory, states and cities could respond to the difficulty of re-
branding by banning national parties from fielding candidates, leaving
the field to local-only parties. But here the First Amendment stands in
the way. State efforts to ban political party endorsements in nonpartisan
and primary elections have been invalidated on First Amendment
grounds,210 and it's likely that a state law excluding national parties from
local partisan elections would face substantial constitutional challenges.2 1'
On top of these hard barriers to rebranding, there are a number of
softer barriers resulting from voter psychology, residential choice, and
candidate incentives, rather than state interventions in the political mar-
ketplace, which likely prove equally important in retarding localized re-
branding.
First, political entrepreneurs who undertake rebranding must sell
their subnational party brand to an electorate whose attention is general-
ly elsewhere. In the few subnational races with substantial media cover-
age and higher stakes, the development of local brands may be possible.
Mayoral and gubernatorial candidates from the local minority party are
sometimes successful because they garner enough attention to develop
and sell their own brand.2 12 But for down-ballot candidates or for a local
party as a whole, voter inattention raises the cost of rebranding substan-
tially. So too do Michigan-Voter imbalances. A minority-party entre-
preneur who sees a huge mass of inert voters on the other side will un-
derstand that a rebranding campaign might not be worth the effort.
Even if the electorate is not inert, the minority-party entrepreneurs
face a credible-commitment problem. They must convince voters that
what they say is what they will do if put in power.213 Talk is cheap; so too
is voting if you are a legislator whose party is perpetually in the minority.
If a party has been so long out of power that even the most attentive vot-
ers have no subnational "running tally" to draw upon in judging it, and if
the subnational median voter's running-tally assessment of the party at
the national level is decidedly negative, it will be no easy task to convince
the subnational electorate to give the minority party a chance to prove
itself at the reins of state or local government.
Supply-side factors-specifically, the desire of local candidates or
activists to move up through a vertically integrated party to higher, more
powerful levels of government-may also thwart rebranding. Consider a
210. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989); Cal. Democratic Party v.
Lungren, 919 F. Supp. 1397, 1398-99 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
211. See Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 468-72 (analyzing the constitutionality of such pro-
posals).
212. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
213. Recall Shor's perplexing discovery that Republican state legislators in Massachusetts are
much closer to the state's median voter than their Democratic counterparts. See Shor, supra note 189,
at 19 fig.6. It may be that the Republicans' failure to convert their ideological proximity into majority
status owes to many voters' disbelief that Republican lawmakers would continue to vote this way if
given control of the statehouse.
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city outside of the national political mainstream, like San Francisco. Im-
agine that a local group of moderate Republicans tries to create a distinc-
tive "San Francisco Republican" brand, and does careful polling to iden-
tify wedge issues that could split municipal Democrats, such as public-
sector pensions, school reform, and aggressive panhandling. But to have
any traction with the median voter in San Francisco, the Republicans dis-
cover that they would also have to stake out positions that are anathema
to the national party, like supporting same-sex marriage and city-funded
abortion clinics. If they have any ambitions to go further in politics,
these San Francisco Republicans would face a dilemma. Becoming com-
petitive locally would ruin their careers in state and national politics, and
diminish their access to state and national networks of party funders.
The smart play may be to avoid getting involved in local politics at all.214
Finally, it bears emphasis that rebranding entrepreneurs do not
write on clean slates. The major party brands already have well-
developed meanings, established through national politics. Rebranding
the Republican Party for San Francisco is like rebranding the local
McDonald's as a purveyor of haute cuisine.
4. Summary
Commentators have long sung the virtues of government "closer to
the people." But empirical research on state and local elections casts
doubt on this position. Many subnational elections appear to be plagued
by mismatch between the ideological content of the major-party brands
and the issue-space and electorate of the subnational government; and/or
by mismatch between voters' perceptions of the party brands and the
parties' actual positions and achievements in the subnational govern-
ment. These problems can be compounded by disparities in the number
of Michigan Voters affiliated with each party in the jurisdiction.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Ever since The American Voter, the question for political scientists
studying voter ignorance has been "whether democracy works" given
how little voters know about politics. The main lesson of Part II was that
that question has no single answer-democracy is likely to work less well
in some places and better in others, holding constant the level of voter
knowledge. We turn now to the question of what this implies for the
field of election law, beginning with policy and then moving to constitu-
214. The extent to which such strategic considerations retard rebranding is probably context de-
pendent. It depends on how pervasive and strong the desire to "move up" is within the pool of poten-
tially strong local candidates (and how big that pool is). And it depends on whether national-level
actors and primary voters in a jurisdiction are willing to tolerate local efforts to develop "deviant,"
competitive sub-brands, or whether they are too worried that such brands will muddy voters' appre-




We argue that policymakers concerned with voter competence face
a threshold, fork-in-the-road choice: whether to provide partisan infor-
mation on the ballot, while adopting other reforms meant to foster voter
understanding of party brands and major-party rebranding to the issue-
space and electorate in question, or whether to suppress partisan infor-
mation on the ballot and provide what we will call party substitute cues
instead. At present, the choice between these strategies is largely a mat-
ter of guesswork, because so little is understood about either the dynam-
ics of party rebranding or the efficacy of party substitutes. We will offer
a number of hypotheses and reform suggestions meant to inform subse-
quent research and institutional tinkering.
Our analysis of the voter information problem also has implications
for the courts. We argue that the Supreme Court has badly flubbed the
"state interest" side of the balance in its party-rights cases. More tenta-
tively, we also propose a new way to think about rights of association
with political parties. Our proposal would resolve a number of
longstanding conundrums in this body of law.
A. Better Voting: On Parties and Party Substitutes
Legal-academic commentary on the problem of informed voting has
been focused almost entirely on campaign-finance disclosure regimes.215
Relying on the "cues" literature, a number of scholars have argued that a
central objective of campaign finance law should be to reveal, promptly,
the "real party in interest" behind large donations to candidates, issue-
advocacy campaigns, and ballot measure committees.2 16 Once this infor-
mation enters the public domain, the argument goes, opposition figures
and the news media will bring it to the attention of voters for whom it is
useful.217  Some advocate even stronger measures. Michael Kang and
Justin Levitt, for instance, have argued that source information should be
disclosed to voters as part of the political communication itself, with
state-mandated voiceovers and labels. 2 18
Elizabeth Garrett, the election law scholar most attuned to the in-
formation problem, has also recognized that the ballot itself represents a
215. For some exceptions, see sources cited supra note 2.
216. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign Disclo-
sure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly
Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48
UCLA L. REV. 265 (2000); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Com-
petence Through Heuristic Cues and "Disclosure Plus," 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1176-83 (2003). But
see Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 257-71 (2010) (critiquing
disclosure advocates for presupposing an attentive, engaged electorate).
217. Garrett & Smith, supra note 216, at 297.
218. Kang, supra note 216, at 1176-83 (regarding voiceovers); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Im-
pact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 217, 225-29 (2010) (proposing "Democracy Facts"
label).
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uniquely promising medium through which to educate low-information
voters.219 Information provided on the ballot is available at low cost to
voters, and accessible precisely when it's needed. (As discussed in Part
II, there is compelling evidence that party labels on the ballot substan-
tially affect vote choice, as does the language used to describe ballot
measures.) Garrett has suggested that candidates be allowed to make
short statements on the ballot, with which candidates could identify their
key endorsers as well as dubious sources of support for their oppo-
nents.220 Garrett has also proposed that a public agency be given authori-
ty to identify issues of top priority to the electorate, to poll candidates for
their positions on those issues, and to print the candidates' responses on
the ballot.221
We are intrigued by Garrett's ballot-improvement project, and
quite sympathetic to the goal of revealing the identity of major donors.
But the legal-academic commentary has missed something important: the
singular virtues (for informed voting) of well-calibrated party cues, and
of transparent, low-cost information about party control of government.
For reasons that should be clear by now, a well-calibrated partisan
cue, provided on the ballot for easy consumption by ordinary voters,
likely has far more potential to improve voter performance than does
disclosure of big-money interest-group and corporate donors. For the
disclosure model to pay dividends, the election campaign must be high
profile so that ordinary voters are actually aware of the interest-group
cues. Further, the electorate must be pretty sophisticated, consisting of
voters who can successfully link interest-group cues to their own interests
or ideological beliefs, and who are not bamboozled by warring cues. 222
The disclosure model would have more of an upside, as Garrett has
recognized, if it were feasible to provide interest-group cues on the ballot
itself. But here great danger lurks. As James Gardner points out, state-
ments on the ballot amount to unrebutted arguments with the potential
to similarly affect large numbers of poorly informed voters.2 3  What
would otherwise have been self-canceling errors in voter beliefs can be-
come correlated errors as a result, reducing the aggregate competence of
the voting public. Even if voters are not misled, ballots filled with candi-
date statements and interest-group cues would be considerably longer,
and longer ballots result in more "rolloff"-abstention from down-ballot
219. Garrett & Smith, supra note 216, at 296.
220. Garrett, supra note 2, at 1584-86.
221. Id. at 1582-86.
222. The political scientist Cheryl Boudreau recently began an important research project on the
comparative operation of party and interest-group cues. Her initial laboratory experiments show that
party cues are much more powerful than endorsements by party-affiliated interest groups. Cheryl
Boudreau, Conflicting Cues. Consistent Opinions? How Party Cues and Endorsements Affect Public
Opinion (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
223. James A. Gardner, Neutralizing the Incompetent Voter: A Comment on Cook v. Gralike, 1
ELECTON L.J. 49,59 (2002).
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races-reducing the representativeness of the electorate in those races.224
Well-calibrated partisan cues are uniquely suited to inclusion on the
ballot itself. They are succinct, encapsulating within a single word or
phrase a host of issue positions. They matter to all ideological voters be-
cause they separate the leading candidates on the main divisions of poli-
tics. (By contrast, an interest-group cue is germane only to particular is-
sues, which generally matter only to narrow issue-oriented publics.) And
partisan cues are useful even to non-ideological voters-so long as the
voter has an opinion about the government's performance-because par-
tisan cues, unlike interest group cues, enable voters to relate candidates
to the incumbent governing coalition. Finally, the meaning of party cues
cannot easily be shaded by the manner of their presentation on the bal-
lot. They are just labels after all, not exercises in political rhetoric.
So the question arises, what can law do to improve party labels, es-
pecially in light of party-brand failures? And, further, is there anything
that law can do when well calibrated party labels are not enough-when
attribution errors, or non-self-canceling Michigan Votes, or a simple lack
of knowledge about which party was in control deprives the party label
of its ordinary utility as an aid to collective choice and accountability?
We think there is.
But reformers must make a threshold choice between two mutually
incompatible strategies. We shall call these the better partisan voting
strategy, and the party substitutes strategy. The former entails clarifying
linkages between the government, the major parties, and candidates for
office; lowering the cost to voters of acquiring this information; and
structuring the legal regulation of political parties so as to enable and en-
courage rebranding to the issue-space and electorate associated with the
government in question. The party-substitutes strategy suppresses the
very same information-raising the cost to voters of learning about par-
ty-candidate and party-government linkages-while inducing the crea-
tion of alternative, party-like cues and furnishing these on the ballot.
There are significant tradeoffs between these strategies, which we
cannot fully explore given space limitations. Party-substitute cues can be
more precisely tailored to the subnational government in question, and
they offer more leverage against Michigan-Voter imbalances and party-
biased perceptions. But because party-substitute cues would vary by
name from one jurisdiction to the next, voters would face higher search
costs than if the conventional party labels were used everywhere (and
correlated in their content across jurisdictions). Potential economies of
scale in branding would also be lost.
224. See Peter Seib, Supersized Votes: Ballot Length, Uncertainty and Choice in Direct Legislation
Elections, 135 PUB. CHOICE 319, 319, 325 (2008) (finding that longer initiative ballots result in greater
roll-off, more confusion and a reduction in "voters' ability to translate their political preferences into
consistent policy choices").
No. 2]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
1. Better Partisan Voting (Through Law)
Reformers who opt for the better partisan voting strategy may pur-
sue it on a number of levels. They may undertake to improve the availa-
bility of major-party cues, voters' apprehension of the cues, the consisten-
cy of the cues, and the tailoring of the cues to issue-space and electorate
in question. The balance of this Subsection presents a number of reform
suggestions, but we offer them more as ideas worth exploring and testing
rather than as confident prescriptions.
a. Availability
Partisan cues are available to the extent that voters know the cue at
the moment of decision. The most obvious availability-oriented reform
is to convert formally nonpartisan representative elections into formally
partisan elections, with candidates nominated by political parties and la-
beled accordingly on the ballot. Availability strategies may also prove
fruitful in other presently unlabeled elections, such as initiative and ref-
erendum elections, and primary elections. These elections could be giv-
en partisan form by authorizing party organizations 22 or party caucuses
in the legislature to make ballot-printed endorsements.226
b. Apprehension
A party label has been apprehended to the extent (1) that voters
correctly infer what the party label signifies about candidate issue posi-
tions with respect to the government in question (ideological apprehen-
sion), and (2) that voters understand the partisan balance of power in the
government (retrospective apprehension).227  Small election law changes
(as well as big constitutional changes) could improve apprehension along
225. In the case of primary elections, it might also be useful to empower minor parties to make
ballot-printed endorsements in the primaries of either or both major parties. Knowing which candi-
dates have been endorsed by significant minor parties could help primary voters to differentiate can-
didates for the party's nomination. (A Christian Coalition Republican is likely to govern quite differ-
ently than a Libertarian Republican.) Giving minor parties this role might also help to bring
disaffected factions into the two-party system, which should improve voter performance as third-party
candidates result in more incorrect voting. See Lau et al., supra note 102, at 407.
226. Seema Mehta, State GOP Tries to Craft Its Own Mail-In Primary Before Prop 14. Takes Ef-
fect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/28/local/la-me-adv-gop-propl4-
20110326. Similarly, county party organizations are sometimes allowed to "bracket" candidates to-
gether to create slates. See Andrews v. Rajoppi, A-4005-0771, 2008 WL 1869869 (N.S. Super. App.
Div. Apr. 29,2008).
227. It should be noted that clarity or distinctness between parties is a different thing from ideo-
logical distance between the parties, although both make voting decisions easier. Parties can be com-
pletely distinct-i.e., all Democrats being to the left of all Republicans-and quite close together on an
ideological scale. In fact, distinctness might increase competition for the median voter, as party mem-
bers and leadership do not have to take far-left or right votes to make clear to their base that they are
really Democrats or Republicans and not DINOs or RINOS. See James M. Snyder, Jr. & Michael M.
Ting, An Informational Rationale for Political Parties, 46 AM. J. POL. Sa. 90, 90 (2002) (developing a
model that suggests that clarity of party labels increases centrism).
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both dimensions, thereby diminishing the problem of mismatched per-
ceptions.
Retrospective Apprehension. We suspect that one minor reform to
ballot design would dramatically improve retrospective apprehension,
especially among less attentive voters. Ballots should "label" the existing
partisan balance in government, not just the endorsement of candidates
by political parties. A large fraction of the electorate does not know the
existing partisan balance even in national elections.28 Designating party
control on the ballot itself would enable many more citizens to hit the
right target when voting retrospectively. As noted earlier, recent work
by Steve Rogers suggests that if all voters knew which party controlled
their state's legislature, the effect of voter approval (or disapproval) of
the state legislature on support for candidates of the majority party
would roughly double.22 9
Another, more far-reaching technique for facilitating retrospective
apprehension is to consolidate offices and functions at a given level of
government. Political scientists have shown repeatedly that retrospective
voting is sensitive to the clarity of control.21 Multi-party governments
and separated powers undermine retrospective accountability; single-
party control enables it. Seen in this light, the existing separation-of-
powers pattern in the United States is strange. As one moves down the
governmental hierarchy (from national, to state, to local), one typically
finds more rather than less separation of powers and functions. Thus,
many states have plural executives, with separately elected governors, at-
torneys general, comptrollers, and the like, in addition to bicameral legis-
latures.231 At the local level, one finds not only separately elected city
councils, mayors, prosecutors, and city attorneys, but also a division of
power and functions between the general purpose municipal or county
government, the school board, and any number of "special districts" with
narrowly defined responsibilities. 23 2
For purposes of democratic accountability, this makes little sense.233
The less informed the electorate about a given level of government, the
more important it is to limit the electorate's monitoring responsibilities
and to simplify its choices.
Ideological Apprehension. Any reform that improves retrospective
apprehension will also enhance ideological apprehension. Voters who
228. See supra note 86.
229. See supra note 201.
230. See Anderson, supra note 203, at 281-86.
231. On the costs of plural executives, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, 2011
U. ILL. L. REv. 1243, 1273-79.
232. See generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 8-16 (7th ed. 2009).
233. It also makes little sense in terms of the conventional diffusion-of-power rationale for sepa-
rated powers. Lower-level governments have fewer powers than higher-level governments, and abus-
es may be checked by corrective action taken at a higher level.
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know which party is responsible for policies recently in the news will also
have a better sense of what that party stands for ideologically.
There are also, we think, unexplored opportunities for improving
ideological apprehension via direct democracy. The inclusion of a line
below each ballot initiative that told voters which political parties sup-
ported it would help voters who know something about the initiative to
learn something about the party, as well as voters who know something
about the party to learn something about the initiative.
Ideological apprehension might also be advanced by introducing a
modified, party-based version of the referendum. Suppose that each ma-
jor-party caucus in the legislature were authorized to put one referendum
measure on the ballot during each legislative election. These would like-
ly be seen by voters as representing the party caucuses' preeminent legis-
lative objectives, 23 4 and as such would convey more information about
party ideology than would the caucus's decision to endorse (with a ballot
label) a quotidian ballot initiative. The party referendum measures
would probably receive lots of campaign attention, both because of their
signification about what the party stands for, and because the caucuses
and the candidates they support would invest in spreading the message. 235
We suspect that the "party-caucus referendum" would be particularly
helpful in jurisdictions that have long been dominated by one party,
where voters trying to gauge the likely policy consequences of voting the
opposition party into power have no reservoir of experience with its rule
to draw upon. 236
c. Consistency
Party cues are consistent insofar as candidates running under the
party label espouse the same positions and stick to them over time. Con-
sistent cues are easier for voters to use, but there is a tradeoff to be
struck because too much consistency would impede party adaptation and
eventually result in uncompetitive elections. Reformers should ask
whether the person or entity who ascribes the party label-primary vot-
ers, caucus goers, etc.-is well placed to make the tradeoff. We do not
have particularly ingenious ideas for how best to strike the balance, but
we are skeptical of regimes such as Washington state's "top two" prima-
234. At least with respect to the minority party, which is blocked from achieving its objectives
through the ordinary legislative process.
235. Contrast the abstract and lengthy platforms that party activists draw up. These do not be-
come law when the party is voted into power, and, having been drafted by activists rather than legisla-
tors, they may not well reflect the views of the figures who really count, i.e., government officials
elected on the party label.
236. Note that improving voters' understanding of the principal opposition party should also facil-
itate retrospective voting against the party in power. See Anderson, supra note 203, at 284-85 (review-




ry, which permits candidates to self-ascribe party labels. 237
d. Tailoring (Undoing Party-Brand Mismatch)
The most difficult and delicate task for reformers pursuing the bet-
ter partisan voting strategy is figuring out how to induce the develop-
ment of differentiated, well-tailored party sub-brands that are legible to
voters at the state and, especially, the local government levels. The diffi-
culty of this task owes to the variety of forces that can cause party-brand
and perceptual mismatch; to the intractability of some of those forces
(such as voter inattention to lower-stakes governments); to the lack of
empirical research on the dynamics of rebranding; and to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence of political party rights.238
But one should not infer that the project of better tailoring through
law is hopeless. One positive step, mentioned earlier, is to permit voters
to register as members of different parties for purposes of different levels
of government.39 Comparatively conservative Democrats in liberal
states and cities would be free to participate in state and local Republi-
can primaries without abandoning the Democratic primary for national
office; vice-versa for relatively liberal Republicans in conservative states
and cities. This should help the local minority party to become more
competitive vis-A-vis the median voter in the locale.24 0 (While this reform
would face a substantial constitutional challenge, other reforms that en-
able party switching on Election Day, such as "same-day registration,"
could also help and would likely be on safer ground.241 )
Local party activists and officials will not, of course, be motivated to
build a competitive local brand unless citizens are willing and able to
vote in state and local elections on the basis of local rather than national
party preferences. The main barriers here are cognitive and affective,
though strategic voting could be a factor too if lower-level governments
can shape the partisan balance of power at higher levels.24 2
237. Cf Mathew Manweller, The Very Partisan Nonpartisan Top-Two Primary: Understanding
What Voters Don't Understand, 10 ELECTION L.J. 255 (2011) (documenting extensive voter confusion
about the signification of party labels under Washington's system).
238. See infra Part Ill.B.
239. Similarly, laws giving automatic ballot places in local elections to parties that do well state-
wide could be repealed. See Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 468-70.
240. To be sure, one-party dominance might still be hard to dislodge, for strategic voters may be
reluctant to leave the one primary that matters in any given election. However, shocks to the political
system, like a scandal followed by a particularly attractive candidate opting into the opposing primary,
could shake the party system at the local level into some kind of competitive balance.
241. Rebranding might also be encouraged by structural reforms that increase the payoff to win-
ning (subnational) median-voter support, and that lengthen the time horizon of legislators serving in
subnational government. In the first category are things like eliminating supermajority requirements
for the passage of legislation, and crafting legislative districts so as to create a large "winner's bonus"
for whichever party draws the most votes. In the second category are things like eliminating term lim-
its and increasing legislative pay.
242. The most significant current tie between state-level elections and party control over the fed-
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Ballot designers may be able to soften affective barriers to voting
against one's national party preference by describing party brands in
terms of the government at issue. If this reform were implemented, San
Francisco voters (for example) would receive a ballot labeling candidates
for national office "National Democrat" or "National Republican," can-
didates for state-level office "California Democrat" or "California Re-
publican," and candidates for municipal office "San Francisco Demo-
crat" or "San Francisco Republican."243 The geographic signifier would
remind San Francisco liberals that "Republican" might not have the
same meaning at different levels of government.
Electoral reforms that loosen party-enrollment requirements for
participating in primary elections may also tend to soften affective ties
between voters and parties. In an ingenious field experiment, Alan Ger-
ber and colleagues showed that "independent leaners" in Connecticut
who were reminded that they had to enroll with a party to vote in the up-
coming presidential primary not only enrolled and voted at higher rates
than members of the control group, they also displayed more characteris-
tically partisan evaluations of the President and Congress than inde-
pendent leaners in the control group.2" Other research has shown that
voters self-identify as independent at higher rates in states with closed
than open primaries,2 45 and that party identification appears to be stickier
in the closed-primary states. 246
More generally, anything that gives voters access to low-cost, relia-
ble information about governmental performance should help to solve
the mismatch problem.2 47 Better information about subnational govern-
ment performance will reduce mismatch at the level of perceptions, and
thereby incentivize minority-party activists to rebrand their party so that
it represents an ideologically plausible alternative for the subnational
median voter who is dissatisfied with the incumbent regime's perfor-
eral government is state legislatures' control over congressional redistricting. The adoption of inde-
pendent redistricting for congressional elections might, on the margins, increase citizens' willingness
vote in state elections on the basis of state rather than national considerations.
243. This example presumes that municipal officeholders compete in partisan elections. In Cali-
fornia as in many other states, local government elections are presently nonpartisan. See CAL. CONST.
art. 2, § 6(a) (requiring all local elections to be nonpartisan).
244. Alan S. Gerber et al., Party Affiliation, Partisanship, and Political Beliefs: A Field Experi-
ment, 104 AM. POL. SC. REV. 720 (2010) (explaining that an independent leaner is a voter who self-
identifies as independent but reports being "closer" to one party than the other).
245. See, e.g., Barry C. Burden & Steven Greene, Party Attachments and State Election Laws, 53
POL. RES. Q. 63 (2000); Anna Harvey & Bumba Mukherjee, Electoral Institutions and the Evolution of
Partisan Conventions, 1880-1940, 34 AM. POL. RES. 368 (2006). Though Burden and Greene use
cross-sectional data, they find that the effect occurs only among citizens who are registered to vote,
suggesting that it is causal.
246. Matthew P. Thornburg, Party Registration and Party Identification: How Institutional Rules
Affect the Stability of Party Identification (2012) (Paper presented at the 2012 Conference of the
Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with authors).
247. Consider for example Heather Gerken's promising proposal for a "Democracy Index," de-
signed to inform voters in Secretary of State elections about the relative quality of their state's election




2. Substitutes for the National Party Labels
The previous Subsection provided a grab bag of ideas for improving
the quality of party labels. But what can be done for states and cities
where the quality of major-party labels is essentially irrelevant (as may
result from an imbalance of Michigan Voters), where mismatch proves
incurable, or where entrenched legal norms require nonpartisan elec-
tions? The simplest remedy is to permit home-grown parties to contest
local elections while excluding the national parties. 248 But this would face
a substantial First Amendment challenge.24 9
Alternatively, the subnational government could adopt formally
nonpartisan elections-candidates would qualify for the ballot by gather-
ing signatures or paying filing fees-while providing voters with party la-
bel substitutes on the ballot. A party-label substitute, as we use the term,
is an alternative notation that functions like a well-calibrated major-party
cue, in that it (1) locates candidates along the main ideological dimension
of politics at the level of government in question, (2) is binary in charac-
ter, (3) divides the electorate pretty evenly along the main ideological
dimension, (4) develops meaning as voters observe politics and link con-
ditions in the world around them to the figures then in charge of gov-
ernment, and (5) resists manipulation through the manner of its presen-
tation on the ballot.250
What alternatives to conventional party labels would function in
this way? In the balance of this Subsection, we sketch a couple of pro-
posals, one modest and the other more ambitious. The modest option is
to authorize the most powerful elected official in the jurisdiction (e.g.,
the mayor or governor) to make ballot-printed endorsements in legisla-
tive races. The more ambitious alternative is to establish a novel system
of advisory primaries, which would be open to voters and candidates
without regard to party affiliation and would incentivize participants to
sort into competing umbrella coalitions on the basis of their local policy
preferences.
248. See Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 470-73. Cf Schleicher, What If, supra note 2, at 117-18,
152-56 (proposing a supranational vote distribution requirement to induce the formation of new, su-
pranational parties for purposes of European Parliament elections-elections that are presently con-
tested and won in each member state by national parties competing on the basis of domestic rather
than EU issues).
249. See Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 468-73.
250. As explained above, the interest-group cues that many legal commentators and some politi-
cal scientists see as critical to competent, low-information voting do not have these properties. See
supra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
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a. The Executive Cue25
Voters are better informed in mayoral and gubernatorial elections
than in other local and state elections.25 2 These executive officials receive
much more media coverage than their counterparts in state and local leg-
islatures,m3 and candidates and interest groups spend much more money
on gubernatorial and mayoral races than on races for the state and local
legislatures.
The information differential is evidenced by the fact that out-party
candidates for mayor and governor in one-party-dominated states and
cities occasionally win, notwithstanding the failure of their co-partisans'
efforts to gain control of the legislative chamber. As recently as 2010,
Brad Henry, a Democrat, was the governor of inveterately Republican
Oklahoma; Giuliani and Bloomberg, running as Republicans, won the
mayoralty in deep-blue New York City.
Mayors and governors are also distinctive because of the electoral
pressures they face. They are elected at large, so they must appeal to the
median voter in the jurisdiction as a whole-much more so than local
legislators, whose district-level constituencies may not resemble the ju-
risdiction as a whole, and who are elected in lower turnout contests. 254
But mayors and governors are not slaves to the median voter; they must
also answer to the coalition of interest groups and foot soldiers that
backed their campaigns. As a result of these cross-cutting pressures-
and relatively high levels of media coverage and public attention-
mayors and governors may become "brand names" that resemble, in
their ideological content, a major-party brand within a healthy two-party
system.
Our proposal is simple: Give the Mayor or Governor the power to
make on-ballot endorsements. This "executive cue" would position vot-
ers to leverage their opinions, positive or negative, about the most widely
251. The argument of this Subsection was first sketched in Chris Elmendorf & David Schleicher,
Making Democracy Work in San Francisco, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 28, 2010, at E4.
252. Recent experimental and survey research by David Anderson shows that voters focus on
presidential and gubernatorial races at the expense of concurrent congressional races, and that voter
search in each race is strongly correlated with correct placement of the candidate on a seven-point
ideology scale. David J. Anderson, Pushing the Limits of Democracy: Concurrent Elections and Cog-
nitive Limitations of Voters (May 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers University), availa-
ble at http://mss3.libraries.rutgers.edu/dlr/showfed.php?pid=rutgers-lib:33379. Anderson did not inves-
tigate voter search in concurrent state legislative races, but it is unlikely that voters pay more attention
to concurrent state legislative races than to concurrent congressional races.
253. See, e.g., Scott L. Althaus & Todd C. Trautman, The Impact of Television Market Size on
Voter Turnout in American Elections, 36 AM. POL. RES. 824, 829-31 (2008) (citing studies and explain-
ing economic incentives for local television stations to focus on statewide elections rather than district-
ed legislative races, especially in large media markets).
254. Cf ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, AMERICA'S UNEVEN DEMOCRACY: RACE, TURNOUT, AND
REPRESENTATION IN CITY POLITICs 88-90. 151-52 (2010) (noting that cities with council-manager




recognized official with a locale-specific platform in elections where they
are relatively poorly informed. And, like a party cue, the executive cue
would enable voters to empower or check the political coalition at the
helm of government by voting for or against that coalition's candidates in
legislative races.255
To be sure, the executive cue is an imperfect substitute for true,
well-calibrated party cues. The cue would prove harder for voters to use
than true party brands, because the trademark would change every time
a new person obtains the executive's office. The utility of the executive
cue is also limited by its one-sidedness. Endorsement of a candidate for
legislative office by the mayor or governor implies that the candidate
would support the endorser's agenda, but the executive cue doesn't in-
form voters about which of the other candidates is the best agent of the
primary opposition coalition. Unlike a true party cue, the executive cue
would not solve the opposition's coordination problem in plurality-
winner elections. Finally, unpopular executives might strategically with-
hold the executive cue, or assign it disingenuously to an uncompetitive
candidate so as not to hurt a stronger ally.
All that said, if the major party cues are persistently dysfunctional
in a city or state, formally nonpartisan elections coupled with ballot-
printed mayoral (gubernatorial) endorsements may enable a low-
information electorate to achieve better results than would conventional
partisan elections.256
b. Advisory Primaries
We think it is possible to improve on the executive cue by inducing
the creation of de facto local political parties and labeling candidates ac-
cordingly on the ballot. The regime we envision would be designed to
mimic a genuinely local two-party system, while standing a better chance
of surviving constitutional challenge than a regime of ordinary partisan
255. Existing research on whether voters' opinions about the governor affect support for his or
her copartisans in partisan state legislative races finds mixed results; the effect is no doubt limited be-
cause conventional party cues trigger so many other powerful associations, such as opinions about the
President and national party identification. Using CCES data, Rogers. supra note 180. at 13, finds a
significant effect of gubernatorial approval-albeit less than half the magnitude of the effect of presi-
dential approval-controlling for economic conditions and approval of the state legislature. By con-
trast, Bishop and Hatch, who add controls for the perceived ideological position of state parties (but
do not control for economic conditions) find no effect of gubernatorial approval. See Bishop & Hatch,
supra note 192, at 16-17. Earlier work employing more limited data sets also finds mixed results; see,
e.g., Michael A. Bailey & Elliott B. Fullmer, Balancing in the U.S. States, 1978-2009. 11 STATE POL. &
POL'Y 0. 148 (2011); Olle Folke & James M. Snyder, Jr., Gubernatorial Midterm Slumps, 56 AM. J.
POL. SCL 931 (2012); Mike Mayo, The Relationship Between an Incumbent Governor's Popularity and
State Legislative Election Outcomes: A Contemporary Assessment of the Coattails Phenomenon
(Jun. 17, 2004) (unpublished masters thesis. Virginia Polytechnic Institute), available at
http://scholar.lib.vt.edultheses/available/etd-06182004-141837/unrestricted/PSCI5994.pdf.
256. The executive cue might also be used to good effect in other subnational elections for which
state law mandates a nonpartisan ballot, such as initiative and referendum elections.
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elections from which successful national parties have been banned.
Here's how we would organize it:
* Candidates would qualify for the general-election ballot through
a conventional nonpartisan process, such as gathering signatures
or paying a filing fee.
* Any self-selected group of citizens (of a certain size) could peti-
tion to sponsor a state-organized, state-administered advisory
primary, setting forth in their petition a name for the primary
and a statement of principles meant to attract candidates and
voters to the event. Signers of the petition need not be members
of any organization or have any prior legal identity, except as in-
dividuals.
* Petitioners, in naming the primary, could not use the names of
ballot-qualified political parties that field candidates in partisan
elections.
* The advisory primaries would be open by law to candidates and
voters without regard to party affiliation. But candidates and
voters would be permitted to enter only one such primary per
election cycle for the level of government in question.
* The winners of the two advisory primaries that achieved the
highest levels of voter participation would be designated on the
general election ballot as the winners of their respective advisory
primaries. The ballot would not designate the winners of other
advisory primaries, or of any nomination process that a political
party might carry out on its own.
* The winner of the most popular advisory primary (by number of
voters participating) would appear first on the ballot; the winner
of the next most popular primary would appear second; and the
remaining candidates would appear in random or alphabetical
order.
* Public funding, if any, would be distributed to advisory primary
winners in proportion to the number of voters participating in
each primary.
This regime would create powerful incentives for interest groups,
candidates, and voters to band together into a pair of competing umbrel-
la coalitions, akin to the major parties in a well-functioning two-party
system. Aiming for the perks of "top two" status-ballot label, ballot
position, and money-advisory-primary organizers would craft initial
platforms that are attractive to large swaths of the electorate. Candi-
dates hoping to benefit from a ballot label will participate only in what
look to be the two most popular of the advisory primaries, lest the candi-
date end up the "winner" of an advisory primary that does not yield a
ballot label. Similarly, engaged voters will opt into the two most popular
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of the advisory primaries because that is where they will find the strong-
est candidates, and where they will avoid wasting their vote in a primary
that does not yield a ballot notation.
This regime would also provide strategic advisory primary voters
with very good reasons not to "raid" the main alternative primary to the
one they prefer (in the hopes of making an unattractive candidate the
winner). Raiding under the system we propose would operate to transfer
tangible benefits-money and ballot position-from the winner of the
voter's preferred advisory primary to his or her principal opponent.
These deterrents to raiding should help to stabilize the meaning of the
ballot labels.
The provisions that deter raiding will simultaneously incentivize
elites to mobilize broad primary turnout. This should help to educate the
masses about what each coalition stands for, and to further stabilize the
meaning of the labels. (The more voters who participate, the harder it is
for a highly mobilized fringe of the electorate to determine the winner.)
In short, this regime should result in a fully functional de facto two-
party system, in which the advisory primary brands are well calibrated to
the issue-space and electorate for the government in question. Elected
officials will customarily have affiliated with one or the other of the dom-
inant advisory primary coalitions, enabling citizens to link government
performance to the "team" in charge, and to vote accordingly in the next
election. And the leading advisory primary brands would be reused in
successive elections, giving them some of the consistency of real party
brands.257
Indeed, our advisory primary regime might well outperform the
conventional party system with primary elections in some respects, even
apart from mismatch or failures due to an imbalance of Michigan Voters.
By linking public financing and ballot position to primary-election turn-
out, our model creates stronger incentives for elites to mobilize broad
participation and does away with the need for restrictive advance-
registration rules (conventionally defended as antidotes to raiding).,- It
is a fair hope too that voters would have weaker affective ties to "their"
advisory primary than to their political party, with a corresponding re-
duction in cognitive bias and Michigan-style voting.25 9 Voters would not
257. The consistency, both across time and across offices at a level of government, and the tailor-
ing of the advisory-primary labels are what set our regime apart from California's "top two" nonparti-
san primaries with self-labeling of candidates.
258. In conventional primaries, each candidate has incentives to mobilize only his own support-
ers-while discouraging turnout by the other candidates' supporters. The party as a whole has no in-
terest in boosting primary turnout.
259. Our advisory primary system is also likely to outperform its nearest real-world counterpart:
"fusion" systems, under which several parties can nominate the same candidate, allowing candidates to
have more bespoke brands. See Schleicher, Why, supra note 2, at 469. Fusion is now allowed only in
New York, where it has helped mayoral candidates like Rudy Giuiliani and Michael Bloomberg dis-
tance themselves from their national parties. Id. Fusion differs from our proposal in critical respects.,
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need to register or enroll in an advisory primary group to cast a primary
ballot, nor would the groups that request advisory primaries necessarily
have any legal life between elections.2 6
Would the advisory primary regime survive a constitutional chal-
lenge? We cannot be sure-no one has a very good record predicting
Supreme Court decisions in party rights cases-but we think it would.
For reasons we have made clear, states and cities have a very strong in-
terest in providing voting cues that will not be read through the lens of
national politics. And, in contrast to a system of formally partisan elec-
tions from which the national parties have been excluded, our regime
does not discriminate against any subgroup of recognized political par-
ties.261 The parties would be free to nominate candidates however they
wish, subject to the proviso that their nominees will not be designated as
such on the ballot, just as they can under the familiar, long-established
protocols for formally nonpartisan elections.
To be sure, our advisory primary regime would discriminate against
political parties as a class, in that they alone-relative to the larger class
of organized associations-could not be featured in the name of an advi-
sory primary label. But this naming restriction is minor, and could be
justified as a truth-in-advertising measure.262 Because the advisory pri-
mary must be open to all voters without regard to their party registra-
tion, the organizers' decision to name an advisory primary after an al-
ready recognized political party would be deceptive, as it would falsely
imply that candidates bearing the advisory primary ballot label were en-
dorsed by a political party.2 63  Save for the fact that they may not give
their collective name to an advisory primary ballot label, political party
members who want to organize an advisory primary would stand in ex-
actly the same position as members of any other assemblage of citizens."
however, in that it leaves the major parties on the ballot (we would exclude all de jure parties), and
encourages the formation of numerous minor parties (we aim for just two advisory primary brands).
The proliferation of minor parties under fusion taxes a low-information electorate. Tellingly, fusion
has not enabled Republican candidates to seriously challenge the Democratic dominance of New York
City Council, notwithstanding the contemporaneous success of Giuliani and Bloomberg. Id.
260. Regarding the effects of party-registration requirements on party identification, see supra
notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
261. The Supreme Court has applied generally deferential review to formally nondiscriminatory
restrictions on political-party participation in the electoral process. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997).
262. Minor burdens on political organization and expression created by election law receive ex-
ceedingly deferential review. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of
Electoral Mechanics: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 335-38 (2007).
263. Some courts have recognized a very strong state interest in avoiding voter confusion about
the meaning of ballot labels. See, e.g., Dart v. Brown, 717 F.2d 1491, 1510 (5th Cir. 1983).
264. The naming restriction could also be justified as an exclusion from a nonpublic forum-the
space on the ballot reserved for advisory primary labels-of a class of putative "speakers" whose mes-
sage content falls outside the purpose of the forum. Courts faced with constitutional challenges to re-
strictions on what may be said in state-published voter guides, or on the ballot itself, generally treat
these venues as nonpublic or limited-public fora in which the state has free hand to limit the topics
(content) that may be addressed, and, related to this, the speakers who may do the addressing. so long
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Petitioners for an advisory primary might also challenge the open-
ness requirement on associational grounds, but here too they would
probably fail. Unlike an ordinary primary, an advisory primary would
not have the effect of deciding the endorsement of any existing private or
quasi-private group.265 No existing organization would be deprived of
anything, relative to the constitutionally permissible baseline of a con-
ventional nonpartisan election.2 " The citizens who petition for an advi-
sory primary would have more in common with the people who sign pa-
pers to get an initiative on the ballot than with members of an organized
group bearing conventional rights of association.2 67 These citizens, oper-
ating under ground rules specified in advance, would not have a protect-
ed interest in the labeling of candidates apart from the interest of voters
who affiliate by participating in the organizers' primary.
But whatever holes, constitutional or otherwise, exist in our pro-
posal should not be taken as fatal. The advisory primary concept can be
modified in any of a number of ways. Don't like the selective exclusion
of political parties from lending their name to advisory primary labels?
Expand the ban to include all existing organizations. Think that's a
problem? Have the government create two generically named advisory
primaries-Yellow and Purple-that people can sort into. There will be
no private advisory primary organizers to assert First Amendment claims
and the Yellow and Purple labels will eventually develop political identi-
ties through repeated practice (although with less certainty and less
quickly than under our proposal). Object to the top-two limitation in the
labeling rules? Get rid of it. A two-label regime will likely evolve any-
way, for the ordinary Duvergian reasons,26 although again with less cer-
as the state remains neutral as to viewpoints with respect to the content of the forum. See, e.g., Cog-
swell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2003) (classifying voter guide as a limited public
forum); Schrader v. Blackwell, 241 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2001) (treating ballot labels as a nonpublic fo-
rum). The state's purpose in setting up the forum, as it were, is to communicate to voters where can-
didates stand on local issues. Naming an advisory primary after a national party would introduce in-
formation inappropriate for the forum.
265. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 454 (2008) (rejecting
party organization's facial challenge to rule allowing candidates to list their party preference on the
ballot in a formally nonpartisan "top two" primary because it did not determine the endorsement of a
party nor were voters likely to be confused that it did).
266. To be sure, an advisory primary organizer could conceivably misappropriate an existing or-
ganization's brand. In that case, the organization might have a cause of action for trademark in-
fringement, but not a constitutional basis for objecting to the state law.
267. Organizers of ballot petition drives do have protected "associational" interests in the actual
process of gathering signatures. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitution Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182
(1999) (Thomas J., concurring); McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir.
1995). First Amendment associational interests would not, however, be implicated by restrictions on
what may be achieved, as a matter of law, through the ballot petition process. Cf. Gordon v. Lance,
403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding supermajority vote requirements for the enactment of certain referen-
dum measures). A challenge brought by petitioners for an advisory primary to the ground rules for
the primary itself would fall into the latter category.
268. Assuming first-past-the-post elections, Duverger's Law holds that the political system will
tend toward having two major parties. MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Barbara North & Robert North trans., 1959).
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tainty and less quickly than under our proposal.
Perhaps advisory primaries are not the answer. But something like
them-a party-like substitute-would be enormously useful in jurisdic-
tions where the Michigan Vote is not neutralized through aggregation,
where the major parties cannot be induced to develop well-tailored local
brands, and where voter perceptions of the local content of the major-
party brands are swamped or distorted by the voter's take on the parties
as national-level actors.269
B. The Constitutional Law of Party Rights
Our account of the voter information problem has implications not
only for policymakers, but also for judges faced with constitutional chal-
lenges to the regulation of political parties. The Supreme Court treats
the First Amendment as a source of protections for the autonomy of po-
litical parties, and for parties' access to the ballot in formally partisan
elections. The Court has held, for example, that the state may not bar a
political party from inviting unaffiliated voters to participate in its prima-
ry;270 or require parties to nominate candidates through "blanket prima-
ries" open to nonmembers;27 1 or impose on party organizations a particu-
lar corporate form, or an obligation not to endorse primary-election
candidates. 272
Prevailing doctrine subjects "severe" burdens on political parties'
First Amendment interests to strict scrutiny, whereas reasonable, nondis-
criminatory restrictions (sometimes called lesser burdens) receive very
lax review.273 To implement this framework, courts must be able to eval-
uate the strength of state interests brought forth on behalf of challenged
regulations, and have some principled basis on which to distinguish se-
vere from lesser regulatory burdens. Our analysis of the voter-
information problem casts serious doubt on much that the Supreme
Court has said when evaluating state interests. It also points toward a
potentially useful way of thinking about burden severity.
1. State Interests in the Regulation of Political Parties
States have often defended public regulation of political parties and
the candidate-nomination process by arguing that the First Amendment
269. We do not mean to imply that "party substitutes" are the only way to attack the voter infor-
mation problem when party cues are absent or unavailing. As the introduction to Part III noted, many
other questions about the effects of law on voter competence are worth investigating.
270. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986).
271. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,578 (2000).
272. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229 (1989).
273. See generally Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 507 (2008).
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burdens of the election law at issue are outweighed by the law's benefits
for voter competence or, one step removed, for the "integrity" of the ma-
jor parties. The Supreme Court's responses to these arguments run the
gamut from equivocal and naYve to ludicrous and possibly disastrous.
Three problems concern us particularly. One, the Court has been
evasive about whether the promotion of informed voting is a "compel-
ling" state interest, and as such potentially capable of sustaining a law
subject to strict scrutiny. For years the Court danced around this issue;274
nowadays, it tends to describe the interest as "important," placing it in
the netherworld between "legitimate" and "compelling."275
The second problem lies in the Court's default empirical supposi-
tions about what voters know and how they behave. On more than one
occasion the Court has answered arguments about the importance of
consistent party labels by declaring "[the defendant's] argument depends
upon the belief that voters can be "misled" by party labels. But our cases
reflect a greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform them-
selves about campaign issues." 276
On the basis of this faith the Justices cavalierly dismissed both the
state's defense of mandatory closed primaries in Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Connecticut,277 and the major parties' attack on Washington's
"top two" primary regime with candidate self-ascription of party labels.278
A similar faith in the diligence and attentiveness of the voting public un-
derwrote the Court's rejection of early filing deadlines for independent
candidates in Anderson v. Celebrezze,279 and durational residency re-
quirements for voting in Dunn v. Blurnstein.2 0 "Faith" is the key word
274. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631-33 (1969) (avoiding ques-
tion of whether the state may "in some circumstances ... limit the exercise of the franchise to those
'primarily interested' or 'primarily affected"' in response to voter ignorance); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 356-57 (1972) ("[W]ithout deciding as a general matter the extent to which a State can bar
less knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the franchise, we conclude that durational residence
requirements cannot be justified on this basis." (internal citations omitted)).
275. The "important" formulation traces to Jenness v. Fortson. 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) ("There
is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support before printing the name of a ... candidate on the ballot-the interest ... in avoiding confu-
sion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election." (emphasis
added)).
276. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
277. Id.
278. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 454 (2008)
("[R]espondents' assertion that voters will misinterpret the party-preference designation ... depends
upon the belief that voters can be 'misled' by party labels. But our cases reflect a greater faith in the
ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues." (internal citations and quota-
tion marks omitted)).
279. 460 U.S. 780, 797 (1983) ("[T]oday the vast majority of the electorate not only is literate but
is informed on a day-to-day basis about events and issues that affect election choices and about the
ever-changing popularity of individual candidates.").
280. 405 U.S. 330, 358 (1972) ("[T]he State cannot seriously maintain that it is 'necessary' to re-
side for a year in the State and three months in the county in order to be knowledgeable about ...
elections." (internal citations omitted)).
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here. The Court has shown little interest in what political scientists actu-
ally understand about voting."' It has simply presumed a "well informed
electorate," 282 one in which "the vast majority" of voters follow "on a
day-to-day basis [the] events and issues that affect election choices.""11 3
This may explain the third and most glaring flaw in the political
rights jurisprudence: the Court's repeated suggestion that the most prom-
ising means for improving voter competence-the adoption of regula-
tions meant to strengthen political parties and better calibrate their
cues-is not even a legitimate object of state action.
In Tashjian, for example, the Court shockingly concluded that the
"relative merits of closed and open primaries" for "promot[ing] respon-
siveness by elected officials and strengthen[ing] the effectiveness of the
political parties" are flat-out irrelevant to whether the state may require
major political parties to close their primaries to nonmembers.284 Similar-
ly, in California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Court pronounced that
states may not regulate partisan primaries with the goal of "producing
elected officials who better represent the electorate." 285 This, the Court
said, was "simply circumlocution for producing nominees and nominee
positions other than those the parties would choose if left to their own
devices" and as such "a stark repudiation of freedom of political associa-
tion."2" And in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Commit-
tee, the Court held that states may not regulate the structure and govern-
ance of party organizations, or prevent party organizations from making
endorsements in primary elections, because "even if a ban on endorse-
ments saves a political party from pursuing self-destructive acts, that
would not justify a State substituting its judgment for that of the party."28 7
Whatever one makes of the asserted First Amendment interests on
the other side of the balance, the Court's position that there can be no
legitimate state interest in regulating the major parties' internal organiza-
tion or candidate nomination procedures for the purpose of maintaining
reliable party cues and better representing the electorate is indefensible.
In our two-party system, these are the major parties' principal social
281. A partial exception is Dunn v. Blumstein, where the Court did point to evidence suggesting
that most learning about candidates occurs during a brief period before the election. See id. at 358
n.30 (citing studies).
282. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 454.
283. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797. As one would expect, the Supreme Court's error has ramified
through the lower courts. See, e.g., Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. Grange, No. 11-35125, slip
op. at 480-83 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2011) (sustaining grant of summary judgment to defendants in First
Amendment challenge to "top two" primary with party-preference ballot notations, and reasoning
that, even though plaintiffs introduced statistical evidence of voter confusion, they had not created a
triable issue of fact on whether a "well-informed electorate will interpret a candidate's party-preference
designation to mean that the candidate is the party's chosen nominee or representative or that the par-
ty associates with or approves of the candidate" (quoting Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 454)).
284. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 222-23 (1986).
285. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000).
286. Id.
287. 489 U.S. 214, 227-28.
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functions. 28 Their importance is clear from the evidence, surveyed
above, about the performance of nonpartisan elections and nonpartisan
legislatures. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that a vertically in-
tegrated political party-one which fields candidates at multiple levels of
government-will, if left to its own devices, perform these social func-
tions well at each level. The Court's holdings in Tashjian, Eu, and Jones
may be justifiable,289 but the reasoning the Court offered, if taken at face
value, denies the very legitimacy of corrective state action in response to
critical failures of the political market.
This cannot be right. But until the Court recognizes its error, "tai-
loring" reforms meant to influence the ideological content of the major-
party cues-such as forcing parties to allow primary-election participa-
tion by members who enroll for that level of government only-will face
substantial constitutional roadblocks. This is further impetus for our par-
ty-substitutes strategies.
2. How to Think About Burdens on Political Party Association
Two postulates about the associational rights of political parties
command broad agreement among legal scholars. First, political parties
must enjoy some constitutional protections; they cannot be treated simp-
ly as playthings of the government. As Daniel Lowenstein put it, "[t]he
idea of parties as 'public' is in tension ... with the need to assure that the
party system maintains a basic autonomy from the state so that the par-
ties may serve as vehicles for expressing the public's needs and senti-
ments."290
Second, the autonomy or associational claims of major political par-
ties must rest on something beyond a simple analogy to private expres-
sive associations such as the Boy Scouts291 or the NAACP, 29 the analogy
on which the Supreme Court has relied.293  Parties do not have definite
organizational boundaries, but instead consist of loose, often fractious,
and sometimes shifting coalitions of interest groups, candidates, activists,
and voters. 294  Identifying who speaks for a private organization is easy
288. To be sure, the parties can and do perform other important functions. See generally Ethan J.
Leib & Christopher S. Elmendorf, Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and Popular Dem-
ocrats Need Parties, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 69, 83-91 (2012).
289. See, e.g., David Schleicher, "Politics As Markets" Reconsidered: Natural Monopolies, Com-
petitive Democratic Philosophy and Primary Ballot Access in American Elections, 14 Sup. CT. ECON.
REV. 163, 202-09 (2006) (defending Jones).
290. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1741,1750 (1993).
291. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
292. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
293. See Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARv. L. REV. 28, 105-08 (2004) (noting and criticizing this reliance).
294. Lowenstein, supra note 292, at 1760, 1765; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over?
Courts and the Political Process, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 109-10 (2002); Michael S. Kang, The Hydrau-
lics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 142-46 (2005).
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enough; a charter of incorporation usually provides the answer. It is not
so obvious, however, that the "official party charter," such as it is, should
define who may speak for the party. Lowenstein pointed out that the
"party-in-government"-consisting of elected officials who were nomi-
nated by the party membership (usually in primary elections) and subse-
quently voted into office-has at least as strong and probably a stronger
claim to speaking for the party than little known officials of the nominal
party organization.
Further, and more basically, the major parties don't exist primarily
for expressive purposes.295 The affiliates of a major party band together
to elect candidates and to pressure those candidates, once elected, to heed
the party-coalition's concerns. The Supreme Court recognized as much
when it held, in Tashjian and Jones, that political parties have constitu-
tionally protected interests not only in their private or "internal" do-
main,296 but also with respect to their "external" role of nominating bal-
lot-qualified candidates for elective office.29
Finally, unlike most private associations, major parties under the
American system of plurality-winner elections enjoy a natural duopoly.298
Entry by third parties is difficult because most citizens do not want to
waste their votes on an impossible long shot, and because most talented
candidates want a realistic shot at winning. The duopolistic nature of the
major parties means that a party's decision to exclude a would-be joiner
imposes much higher costs on the excluded person than analogous exclu-
sionary acts by private expressive associations.
None of this is controversial. But despite sharing a common diag-
nosis of the problem of party associational rights, legal commentators
have offered diametrically opposed solutions. Some would have the
courts establish a near-absolute right for party organizations to structure
candidate nomination processes as they wish; others would have the
courts defer to the state-strongly in most cases, and almost categorically
when the state action at issue was supported by elected officials from the
plaintiff's political party.
295. See Bawn et al., supra note 135 (developing theory of why activists form parties); Nathaniel
Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750 (2001).
296. Over the years, many courts have tried to cabin party associational rights by distinguishing
the parties "internal" and "external" activities, treating the former as constitutionally protected by
analogy to private expressive associations and the latter as fully regulable state action. See, e.g., Eu v.
S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231-33 (1989) (distinguishing state regulation of a
party's "external responsibilities" from "direct regulation of a party's leaders" and "internal affairs");
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 654 (1944) (holding that Democratic Party is state actor in nominat-
ing ballot-qualified candidates); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Tex. 1997)
(holding that allocation of booths at party convention, and of advertising space in party publication,
were "internal party affairs" as opposed to state action).
297. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) ("In no area is the political associa-
tion's right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee."); Tashjian v. Re-
publican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215-16 (1986) (treating the selection of candidates as the "basic
function" of major parties).
298. Schleicher, supra note 289, at 190-96.
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On the pro-autonomy side, Nathaniel Persily argues that major-
party organizations must be allowed to structure their candidate nomina-
tion procedures largely as they wish, because "[p]arty autonomy... acts
as a critical mechanism for counteracting the majoritarian bias of Ameri-
ca's plurality-based electoral systems." 299 Persily sees in the major parties
a healthy tension between, on the one hand "the demands of competi-
tion" (pressure to nominate candidates who will appeal to the median
voter), and the "demands ... of representation" (attending to groups in
proportion to intensity of interest).3 00 Party organizations, rather than
the state, should mediate these competing demands because this will
"protect minorities' ability to band together into electoral coalitions with
a real chance of gaining access to power." 0 Similarly, Michael Kang ar-
gues that absolute protection for "party autonomy" is the best way to en-
sure "a healthy balance of cooperation and competition" among players
within the party coalition.302
Persily and Kang both assume that autonomous party organizations
would create coherent, competitive political parties. But our analysis
shows that this is not always the case: robust partisan competition, so im-
portant for competent voting and responsive government, is not an inevi-
table or natural state of affairs. 03 Within a federal system, subnational
governments are frequently dominated by one party for decades at a
time. Indeed, a number of the Supreme Court's leading cases arose from
one-party-dominated subnational jurisdictions-from the White Primary
Cases, which dealt with racial minorities' access to primary ballots in Jim
Crow Texas,304 to the recent decision in New York State Board of Elec-
tions v. Lopez Torres," which concerned the process for nominating ma-
jor-party judicial candidates in perennially uncompetitive New York
City.
The other pole in the party-rights debate was staked by Lowenstein,
who prescribed judicial deference to the state in major-party autonomy
cases.30 Most party rights claims are really just conflicts between differ-
ent parts of the party coalition, Lowenstein observed, and no one has a
better claim to resolve these disputes-to speak for the party as a
whole-than the officials who have been nominated and elected to public
office on the party label. 7
299. Persily, supra note 295, at 811.
300. Id. at 819-20.
301. Id. at 820.
302. Kang, supra note 294, at 175.
303. See supra Part II.B.
304. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 208-25 (3d ed. 2007).
305. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
306. Lowenstein, supra note 292, at 1786. For a related perspective, updating Lowenstein's argu-
ment, see Garrett, supra note 296, at 148-52.
307. Lowenstein, supra note 290, at 1764-77.
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Whereas Persily and Kang place their faith in the party organiza-
tion, Lowenstein puts his in the party-in-government. He makes a plau-
sible argument that the party-in-government is more likely to represent
the views of party-affiliated voters than are the titular leaders of the par-
ty organization.30s But it hardly follows that legislators elected on the par-
ty label will devote themselves to making the party into a competitive,
coherent brand at the level of government in question. As a group, they
may care more about holding onto their seats than building or maintain-
ing a legislative majority.3 " As individuals, their interests may lie in creat-
ing personal brands independent of their political parties, in running for
office at a different level of government, or in becoming lobbyists.
Ultimately, we see little basis for privileging ex ante the judgments
of the party organization or the party-in-government. If the ultimate
goal is a system of competitive, coherent political parties, there is little
choice but to examine, on a case-by-case basis, whether particular re-
forms would further or retard that objective.3"o While this may be a diffi-
cult inquiry, it is far more likely to produce representation-enhancing
rules than attempting to decide, once and for all, who speaks for the par-
ty.
As a doctrinal matter, courts could move in our direction by jetti-
soning the notion that there exists some tangible collective of persons
("the membership") that constitutes the party, and a corporeal leader-
ship body that is presumptively entitled to govern the party and to de-
termine what it stands for. The dominant parties in a two-party system
should instead be understood as, in effect, publicly chartered corpora-
tions with a constitutionally conferred public function: to integrate voters
and interest groups into coherent, competitive coalitions with respect to
the government at issue, thereby enabling low-information voters to ob-
tain representation and to hold the government accountable."'
Anyone who wishes to associate in any manner with one of these
umbrella coalitions should be permitted to bring an "associational rights"
claim against state action that hinders the desired association,312 and no
308. After all, does anyone know for whom he voted the last time he cast a ballot for party se-
lectman?
309. For each party caucus, redistricting presents a tradeoff between expanding the number of
seats the party has a chance of winning (by redistributing reliable party voters from the caucus mem-
bers' districts to other, potentially winnable districts), and protecting the security of the existing mem-
bers of the caucus (who are more likely to lose a general election challenge if their core supporters are
assigned to other districts).
310. For a related suggestion, see Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Politi-
cal Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (2001).
311. We shall bracket for the time being whether there are other party functions that the party
rights jurisprudence should protect.
312. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) steps ten-
tatively in this direction. See id. at 600-02 ("I question whether judicial inquiry into the genuineness,
intensity, or duration of a given voter's association with a given party is a fruitful way to approach con-
stitutional challenges to [primary regulations]").
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party-affiliated actors should have a constitutionally protected right to
accept or reject the proposed association. Rather, the presumptive per-
missibility of the challenged barrier to association-the "severity" of the
"burden," as a matter of law-should depend entirely on whether the
regulation tends to enhance or to retard the parties' performance of their
designated public function. If it retards performance, it burdens associa-
tional rights within the meaning of the First Amendment; if it does not,
there is no constitutionally cognizable harm.
A caveat: it is not our position that the First Amendment necessari-
ly should be read in this way. That ultimate judgment requires a weigh-
ing of various interpretive and historical considerations we omit from our
pragmatic analysis. Our point is simply that if one is willing to think
about party rights in expressly functional terms, there is little basis for
treating either the party organization or the party-in-government as pre-
sumptively entitled to control the candidate-nomination process.
IV. CONCLUSION: ELECTION LAW IN LIGHT OF VOTER IGNORANCE
As a legal-academic field of study, election law has been centrally
concerned with questions about the exclusion of disadvantaged voters,
and the use of law to tilt the political field in favor of incumbents or the
then-dominant party. These are important issues, but they exist on the
abusive edge of the electoral arena. What we hope this paper shows is
that there are very important election law questions that affect all voters
in all elections, on the mainland of everyday politics and not just on its
problematic shore.
Questions about voter competence are not about a distant "they,"
but rather are about "we," because, as E.E. Schattschneider noted over
fifty years ago, in a complicated modern state "[t]here is no escape from
the problem of ignorance, because nobody knows enough to run the gov-
ernment."1 The central function of election law is to help citizens aggre-
gate what little information they have into collectively sensible judg-
ments about whether the people running the government should
continue at the helm. The question of how well it performs this task
should animate election law scholarship going forward. The quality of
our democracy depends on it.
313. E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 136 (1960).
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